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ABSTRACT 
Although most of the legislative tasks of the European Parliament (EP) are performed in its 
committees, it is still not clear how representative they are to the overall plenary. Feminist 
theories of legislative organizations suggest that: (1) women parliamentarians are 
concentrated in committees that are concerned with issues related to what can be classified as 
typical “female” policy areas, (2) while men parliamentarians are concentrated in committees 
that are concerned with issues related to what can be classified as typical “male” policy areas. 
These propositions are examined via representative samples of EP committees using an 
original dataset of MEPs´ profiles in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 and 7
th
 EP, and a secondary 
dataset of MEPs´ profiles in the 6
th
 EP. The results show that: women are overrepresented in 
EP committees concerned with social welfare policies and underrepresented in EP committees 
concerned with policies connected to the basic functions of the EU, and economic and 
technic; and that sex has an impact on individual MEPs assignments to EP committees 
concerned with social welfare policies and the basic functions of the EU policies. However, 
although the results show that women are underrepresented in EP committees concerned with 
economic or technic policies, sex appears to have no effect on assignments to EP committees 
concerned with those policies. The study´s finding suggest that feminist theory of legislative 
organization can bring important insights into the study of women´s descriptive representation 
in the EP. Although the theory needs to be revised and further developed at the supranational 
level. 
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1 Introduction 
The European Parliament (EP) has undergone a rapid transformation since the late 1970s. 
Having begun life as a consultative assembly, its involvements in legislation, budgetary 
politics and oversight within the European Union (EU) has grown swiftly since the first direct 
elections in 1979 and the Single European Act (SEA) in July 1987 (Whitaker 2011:1). 
Subsequently, the power of the EP has grown with each treaty, most recently the Treaty of 
Lisbon in December 2009, which placed the EP on equal footing with the Council of 
Ministers (which represents state interest) under the co-decision procedure, in most policy 
domains.
1
 Today, the EP is, arguably, more powerful than most of its national counterparts 
(Yordanova 2011:597; Yoshinaka et al. 2010:457). Being the only direct elected institution of 
the EU, it owes its empowerment to the hopes of solving the EU´s “democratic deficit” 
problem. The Parliament is presumed to increase the openness and transparency of the EU 
decision-making process, and decrease the distance between the EU and its citizens by 
translating their preferences and interests into EU legislation (Yordanova 2011:597).  
The ability of the EP to fulfill these goals is largely shaped by its internal organization, by 
its faculty to exploit its resources and institutional powers effectively and thus exert influence 
in the EU framework (Bowler and Farrell 1995:220f). Like most national legislatures, the EP 
has a committee system that forms its “legislative backbone” (Whitaker 2011:1f). It is in the 
standing committees where the most of the EP´s legislative work is carried out, where 
parliamentary inquiries are executed and where individual Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) can exercise power. Previous research on the EP´s part in EU policy-
making has shown that the EP committees “play a vital role in EU legislation” (Neuhold 
2001:21), and that the EP´s positions are negotiated and in most case already decided at the 
committee stage of the parliamentary legislative process (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003:348; 
Yordanova 2009:254).  
Owning their increasing importance, the EP committees have recently attracted scholarly 
attention, including studies on the composition and assignments of the EP committees 
(Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Whitaker 2011; Yordanova 2009). However, 
                                                 
1
 Initially, the EP had a consultation procedure under which it was allowed to give a non-binding opinion to the 
Council of Ministers. The SEA introduced a co-operation procedure which gave the EP the right to a second 
reading in certain laws and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) created a co-decision procedure under which the EP 
was given the right to a third reading, efficiently given it equal authority with the Council of Ministers. With the 
Treaty of Lisbon, this became the ordinary legislative procedure, which is now the standard approach to law-
making in the EU.   
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although the EP committee membership can largely affect the type of legislation the EP 
adopts, it is still not clear how representative it is to the overall plenary (Yordanova 
2009:254). Thus, even if a key question in committee studies is whether committees are 
representative of the legislative they serve (McElroy 2006:6), and despite an increased 
awareness of the important role played by the EP committees. One research area that to date 
has been largely neglected is women´s representation in the EP committees.  
However, although women´s representation in the EP committees is a research area in 
which the knowledge remains limited, feminist theories of legislative organization is an 
established scholarly. Previous studies on women´s representation in national parliamentary 
committees have found that women, once they have been elected to Parliaments, often are 
found to be concentrated in certain types of committees. More specific, in committees that are 
concerned with issues related to what can be classified as typical “female”2. Additionally, it 
has also been found that women parliamentarians are significantly more likely to be assigned 
to health care and welfare committees than men, and less likely than men to be assigned to 
committees dealing with business and private economic concerns. (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 
1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) Thus, feminist theories of legislative organization 
focus on the numbers of women in Parliaments and highlights two questions in relation to 
women´s representation: first, where are women represented and, second, where are women 
not represented? By addressing these two questions feminist theories of legislative 
organization gives indications of the way the power is distributed between women and men in 
Parliaments (Kantola 2009:380). Hence, women´s representation in the EP committees is 
consequently linked to indications of the distribution of power between women and men 
within the EP. But, nonetheless, a systematic examination of the composition of women and 
men in the EP committees, and the effect of sex
3
 on assignments to the EP committees have 
yet to be undertaken.  
In this thesis, the composition of and assignments to, the EP committees will be examined 
in all direct elected EPs (seven in total). This study aims to test feminist theories of legislative 
organization on the EP committees, with the broader aim to increase the knowledge of 
women´s representation in the EP committees. The research questions are thus:  
 Are women MEPs more or less commonly found in certain types of EP Committees? 
 Does sex have an impact on the assignment of individual MEPs to EP committees? 
                                                 
2
 The concepts female and male refers here to gender roles, see Chapter 3 for a further discussion. 
3
 The concept sex refers here to the legal sex, which in this thesis is restricted to only two sexes, woman and 
man.  
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1.1 Disposition 
The thesis proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, women´s political representation will be 
thorough theorized and discussed. The chapter will begin with a presentation and discussion 
of feminist theories of women´s political representation, followed by a outlining of the 
development of women´s representation in the EP. A review of the relevant literature on 
women´s descriptive representation will thereafter end the chapter. In Chapter 3, the EP 
committees will be considered from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. The 
chapter will begin with an overview of the expansion of the EP committees, which will be 
followed by a presentation of the formal EP committee assignment system. Thereafter, will a 
review of the relevant literature on EP committee assignments and a presentation and 
discussion of the feminist theories of legislative organization, precede a new proposed 
classification of the EP committees. A presentation of the derived hypotheses and a discussion 
of the control variables included in this study will thereafter end the chapter. In Chapter 4, the 
methodology of the empirical analysis of the study will be outlined, and subsequently, in 
Chapter 5, the results will be presented and analyzed. Lastly, in Chapter 6, a discussion of the 
results and conclusions will close the study.   
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2 Women´s political representation 
In the following chapter, women´s political representation will be thorough theorized and 
discussed. The first part of the chapter will focus on feminist theories of women´s political 
representation and establish why this thesis´s focus on the women MEPs in the EP 
committees should matter. In the second part, the policies adopted by the EU to promote a 
balanced representation of women and men in the political decision-making process will be 
presented and discussed. It will be shown that the effectiveness of EU´s policies can be 
questioned. Thereafter, in the third part of the chapter, the development of women´s 
representation in the EP will be mapped out, followed by a review of the relevant literature on 
women´s descriptive representation. The review will show that women´s representation in the 
EP committees is a research area that, even by feminist researches, has been largely neglected. 
2.1 Theorizing women´s political representation 
For a long time, feminist scholars have debated the question: does it matter if women are 
represented in Parliaments or not? Phillips (1998) famously identified four arguments in 
support of women´s political representation: 1) the importance of symbolic representation, as 
women politicians act as role models for future candidates; 2) numerically equal 
representation between women and men in Parliaments is a sing of justice; 3) women are 
positioned to represent women´s interests better than men; and 4) women´s political 
representation renews democracy. Dovi (2007) later built upon this, and put forward two 
additional arguments: 5) the trust argument, which implies that women´s political 
representation is crucial for women´s confidence in political institutions; and 6) the legitimacy 
argument, which implies that the presence of women politicians strengthens the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions. Women´s political representation can thus be justified in its own term: 
it is normatively desirable that Parliaments reflect the composition women and men in society 
and include representatives from both sexes (Kantola 2009:380). On the other hand, it is also 
possible to stress the benefits that women´s political representation produces, by way of 
improving the deliberative process, increasing democratic legitimacy and reducing distrust 
(Mansbridge 1999:654). 
The point of departure for these arguments origins from the theory of politics of preference 
(Phillips 1995) which suggest that individuals’ interests are connected to experiences, which 
in turn are linked to sex. And is built upon the assumption that women and men have different 
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experiences in their everyday life, and that women politicians, at least to some extent, share 
the experiences of other women, and therefore are better equipped to represent the “interests 
of women” (Wängnerud 2009:52). In other words, the arguments predict a link between 
descriptive and substantive representation
4
, that is, a belief that women politicians will have a 
substantive impact on the political decision-making process. That women politicians´ 
represents the “interests of women” and therefore will affect public policy in favor for 
women. However, the expectation that an increasing number of women in legislatures will 
result in more and better public policies for women, are not without problems.  
First, the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is hard to capture. 
(Wängnerud 2009:59). In the feminist literature today, there is both a lack of agreement on 
what to expect when the number of women in Parliaments increases, and competing views on 
which share of the seats in Parliaments women need to occupy, for the impact of women´s 
presence will become apparent.  
Second, women are by no means a coherent group. Women parliamentarians have different 
experiences affecting their interests, e.g. ethnicity, class, age and sexual orientation, and it is 
not desirable, or even possible, to group the diversity of women´s experiences into one single 
category of “women´s interests” (Kantola 2009:381). However, in research on descriptive 
representation, far-reaching definitions of women´s interests are not necessary (Wängnerud 
2009:53). The focus is instead directed towards where women are represented and where not, 
and by addressing this issue, research on descriptive representation gives indications of the 
way that power is distributed between women and men in the political decision-making 
process (Kantola 2009:380).  
This thesis does not attempt to make claims about substantive representation of women or 
about constitution of gender in the political representation process. Rather, the thesis´s focus 
on women´s representation in the EP committees is pertinent as it may give some indications 
of the way that power is distributed between women and men in the EP. Women´s political 
representation in the EP committees is thus an important research area and its importance is 
also stressed by the fact the EU, over the two past decades, has adopted measures to improve 
women’s political representation in both the member states´ parliaments and in the EU´s 
institutions. In the following section, the policies adopted by the EU to promote a balanced 
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 In research on women in parliaments, there is a widely used distinction between substantive and descriptive 
representation. The distinction roughly corresponds with whether the focus is on the effects of women´s presence 
in parliament or on the number of women in parliament. (Wängnerud 2009:52) 
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representation of women and men in the political decision-making process will be presented 
and discussed. 
2.2 Improving women´s representation in Europe 
The EU has encompassed the agenda of balanced representation of women and men in the 
political decision-making process since the 1990s. Initially, the EU´s first steps to advance 
equality between women and men were taken in the Treaties of Rome (1957) Article 119, in 
which it was stipulated that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. This 
initial step was though taken in an all-man environment and it was not until the preparation of 
the Equal Treatment Directive in 1976, that the first feminist actors were included in working 
groups (Hoskyns 1996:101f).
5
 
Although, since then, the EU´s view on women´s participation in the political decision-
making process has altered dramatically. For example, the EP now states in one of its key 
documents in this issue, that equal participation of men and women in decision-making 
“strengthen democracy, by taking account of the interests of the whole of society, and 
promote its proper functioning” and as a result leads to more “efficient use of human 
resources” (European Parliament 2000:16). The EU has both been influenced by international 
developments, such as the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, and has itself been an important 
actor in pushing for balanced representation of women and men in political decision-making 
internationally (Kantola 2009:383). 
The EU´s first action on women´s representation in political decision-making was taken 
with the adoption of the Third Action Programme on Equal Opportunities (1991-1995), in 
which the importance of the participation of women in political decision-making for equal 
opportunities policies was recognized for the first time.
6
 This was later followed by the 
Council Resolution in 1995 on balanced participation of women and men in decision-making, 
and the Council Recommendation in 1996 on the promotion of positive action for achieving a 
balanced participation of women and men in the decision-making process (Council of the 
European Union 1996). Three years after the adopting of the Council Recommendation, nine 
indicators were established by the Council for measuring women’s participation in power 
                                                 
5
 During the formulation of Article 119, the Commission established a special “Article 119” group, however, 
even if the documentation does not reveal who the members of this group were, Hoskyns (1996) argue that “it 
seems highly likely that they were almost entirely men.” due to the fact that, even ten years later, few women 
were involved in working groups (Hoskyns 1996:62).  
6
 In the first two Action Programmes, the emphasis was on equal opportunities at work. 
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structures. The indicators showed that participation was far from being sufficient both at 
national and EU level. (European Parliament 2000:13) 
Further, in 2000 the Commission published a report on the implementation of the Council 
Recommendation (European Commission 2000a). The Commission gave a new definition of 
balanced representation and set 40 percent as the minimum level of participation of women or 
men in committees and expert groups. The Commission noted that there was a variation in the 
perception of balanced representation in member states with the Nordic countries and the 
United Kingdom proposing 50 percent participation whereas the majority of countries 
considered a participation rate of at least 30 percent to represent a balance. (European 
Commission 2000b) The Commission´s definition was thus a result of an increased frustration 
on the lack of implementation and due the fact that the Council Recommendation mentioned 
the need for “balanced representation” without defining in figures the term "balanced". 
Increasing the number of women in the political decision-making process was again 
brought up as one of the priorities in the Commission´s Roadmap to equality between women 
and men (2006-2010), and in the current Commission´s Strategy for equality between women 
and men (2010-2015), equality in the decision-making process is one of five priority areas.
7
 
One of the key actions in the Commission´s Strategy is to promote greater participation by 
women in EP elections, including as candidates, and particular in the 2014 EP election.  
As shown above, the EU has paid attention to the representation of women in the member 
states´ parliaments and in the EU´s institutions and demanded measures to increase it. 
However, the effectiveness of these strategies can be questioned. For instance, the 
implementation of the Council Recommendation and the Council Resolution in the member 
states have been poor and the impact of these strategies limited (Kantola 2009:385). In many 
cases it has been a matter of interpretation and definition whether balanced representation of 
women and men has been achieved. The question is thus how women´s political 
representation looks like in the EP. In the following section the development of women´s 
representation in the EP will be mapped out, followed by a review of the relevant literature on 
women´s descriptive representation, which will show the knowledge of women´s 
representation in the EP committees remains limited. 
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 In December 2010, the Council adopted Conclusions in support for the implementation of the European 
Commission's Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015).  
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2.3 Women in the EP 
Since 1979 when the EP was directly elected for the first time more and more women have 
gradually entered the Parliament. At the outset, the Common Assembly of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (1952-1958) included one woman out of 78 representatives (1.3 
percent). This increased marginally to 3 percent in the Parliament of Six (1958-1972) and to 
5.5 percent in 1978. (Norris and Franklin 1997:188) These MEPs where nominated by 
national legislatures and the responsibility for the low representation of women rested with 
the national parliamentary parties. In this context, the 1979 elections represented a 
breakthrough, resulting in an increase of the number of women to 16 percent. The percentage 
of women MEPs has since then been increasing steadily to 35 percent in the current 7
th
 EP, 
nonetheless still lower than the Commission´s definition of balanced representation of women 
and men (40 percent). Diagram X displays the development of women´s representation in the 
EP from the 1
st
 EP to the current 7
th
 EP. 
Diagram 1: The development of women´s representation in the EP 
 
Source: The official website of the European Commission. 
Although the number of women MEPs has increased over the years, the number of women 
MEPs elected in the member states varies substantially. For example, in the current 7
th
 EP, 62 
percent of the Finnish and 50 percent of the Estonian MEPs are women, compared to 18 
percent of the Czech Republic and 17 percent of the Italian MEPs. Notably is also that Malta 
has not yet had any women MEPs (The official website of the European Commission). 
Further, even if women today constitute 35 percent of the representatives in the 7
th
 EP, it is 
still at a higher level than in most of the member states´ national parliaments. The average 
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percentage of women parliamentarians in the current EU-27 is 26 percent, although in 
Hungary and Malta, for example, women only constitute 9 percent of the members of the 
Parliaments, compared to Sweden, where women constitute 44 percent (The official website 
of the European Commission).
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2.3.1 Literature on women´s descriptive representation 
There is a large body of literature that has focused on the numbers of women in national 
Parliaments and developed explanations for cross-nation variations. Traditionally, feminist 
scholars have distinguished between supply-side and demand-side factors, where the former 
relating to the availability of women parliamentarians and the latter to their usage (Kantola 
2009:387). For example, women´s resources including time, money and the levels of 
education and gainful employment among women may result in women being less able than 
men to contribute to campaigns, take on poorly paid positions in local or regional 
governments or finance their own campaign. However, the focus of scholarly research in 
Europe has gradually shifted, from women´s lack of resources or lack of will to participate in 
politics, towards institutional and cultural explanations.  
It has been established that women do better in electoral system based on proportional 
representation and multi-member constituencies, than majority system and single member 
constituencies. Further, political parties have also been found to be important, as the 
variations in proportion between women and men are even greater across parties than across 
nations (Wängnerud 2009:54ff). Here, political ideology and party organization have found to 
play the leading roles, as parties on the left tend to send more women to Parliament and 
centralized organizations with ties to organizations outside the party are favorable for women, 
due to the fact that they provide more points of access. Other more cultural explanations 
emphasize on socio-economic and socio-cultural factors such as economic development, 
secularization and the level of gender-equality, for the number of women elected. 
Thus, the EP is a very suitable object for studies on women´s representation since there is a 
considerable heterogeneity in culture, economic conditions and political institutional set-up 
among the member states, which all has found to have an impact on the number of women 
elected to Parliaments. Owning up to its intriguingly, the EP has in recent years attracted 
feminist scholarly attention, which seeks to explain why there are more women in the EP as 
opposed to many of the members states´ national Parliaments, including studies on factors 
                                                 
8
 Single or Lower House of Parliament in the current EU-27. 
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related to institutional circumstances (Footitt 1998; Vallance and Davis 1986) and women´s 
policy network´s activism (Krook 2002; Lombardo and Meier 2007). However, although 
feminist scholars have developed explanatory factors for both the number of women´s 
representatives in national Parliaments and in the EP, little or even no attention has been paid 
to the women inside the EP (Galligan and Clavero 2008:5). Thus, no questions have been 
asked in relation to what happens when women actually are in place in the EP, and to date, no 
study has so far sought to explain the internal organization of the EP from a feminist 
perspective. Galligan and Clavero (2008:6f) suggest that the lack of research addressing this 
issue may derive from the difficulty of applying models that have been developed at the 
national level to a supranational context. An added difficulty is that the EU is quite unique in 
many respects, since it has no other supranational comparator. As a result, women´s 
representation in the EP committees is not a well-researched area and the knowledge remains 
limited. But, as showed above, women´s representation in the EP committees is linked to 
indications of the distribution of power between women and men within the EP, and it is 
therefore essential that the knowledge of women´s representation in the EP committees 
increases. 
In summary, the EU has embraced the agenda of balanced representation of women and 
men in the political decision-making process since the 1990s, although the effectiveness of 
the policies adopted by the EU has been questioned (Kantola 2009:385). For instance, even if 
women MEPs occupy a higher percentage of the seats in the current 7
th
 EP than the average 
percentage of the seats in the national Parliaments in the current EU-27 (35 percent compared 
to 26 percent), the percentage of women MEPs in the 7
th
 EP is nonetheless still lower than the 
Commission´s definition of balanced representation of women and men (40 percent). 
Further, feminist scholars have for a long time focused on the numbers of women in 
national Parliaments and developed explanations for cross-nation variations. In recent years, 
feminist scholarly have also directed their attention to the numbers of women elected to the 
EP in comparison the national Parliaments, and developed explanatory factors for variations. 
However, little or no attention has been paid to what happens when women actually are in 
place in the EP, thus research on women´s representation in the EP committees has, even by 
feminist researches, been largely neglected. But, the importance of research, and increased 
knowledge, in this area, is underlined by the fact that women´s representation in the EP 
committees is linked to indications of the distribution of power between women and men 
within the EP. 
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3 The EP committees from an empirical to a 
theoretical perspective  
In this chapter, the EP committees will be considered from both an empirical and a theoretical 
perspective. The first part of the chapter will show the expansion of the EP committees and a 
presentation of the formal EP assignment system. It will be shown that there is no formal rule 
that require that the composition of women and men in the EP committees should reflect the 
composition of women and men in the overall plenary. Thereafter, in the second part, the 
relevant literature on EP committee assignment will be reviewed. The review will show that 
no study on EP committee assignments so far, has fully explored the impact of sex on the 
assignment of individual members to the EP committees. In the third part of the chapter, 
feminist theories of legislative organization will be applied on the EP. First, a discussion 
regarding how this thesis relates to the concepts of “female” policy areas and “male” policy 
areas precedes the presentation of feminist theories of legislative organization. Thereafter, the 
classification of the EP committees and the derived hypotheses are presented. A discussion on 
the control variables included in this study ends the chapter. 
3.1 Overview of the EP committees 
Committees have played a central role in the EP since the institution was first established as 
the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. The Common 
Assembly recognized that committees would help facilitate the problems inbuilt in 
coordinating work in an assembly that only was scheduled to meet in plenary a handful of 
times a year. For this purpose, it created seven committees to conduct Assembly business. 
(McElroy 2006:8; Whitaker 2011:26). However, it was not until the immediate aftermath of 
the first direct elections in 1979 that the committee system was significant expanded and 
developed (McElroy 2006:8). Thereafter, the range of committees expanded gradually, from 
17 committees in the 1
st
 EP to 20 committees in the 4
th
 EP. Although, following the 1999 June 
elections, the number of committees was reduced from 20 to 17 as a part of streamlining of 
the EP´s committee system (Whitaker 2011:29). This alternation was though reversed in the 
6
th
 EP, when the number of committees again increased to 20.
9
 Table 1 shows the expansion 
of the EP committees from the 1
st
 EP to the current 7
th
 EP (see Appendix 1 for a detailed 
                                                 
9
 For a more detailed overview of the development of the EP ´s committee system, see e.g. Whitaker (2011). 
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overview of the EP committees), and the enlargement of the EU from 10 member states in the 
1
st
 EP to 27 member states in the current 7
th
 EP  
Table 1: Committee expansion of the EP from 1979 to 2009 
 
1
st
 EP 
(1979-1984) 
2
nd
 EP 
(1984-1989) 
3
rd
 EP 
(1989-1994) 
4
th
 EP 
(1994-1999) 
5
th
 EP 
(1999-2004) 
6
th
 EP 
(2004-2009) 
7
th
 EP 
(2009- ) 
No. of  
committees 
17 18 19 20 17 20 20 
No. of MEPs 434 518 518 626 788 732 754 
Total no.  
of committee seats 
 
523 
 
599 
 
651 
 
768 
 
876 
 
861 
 
848 
Average  
committee size 31 33 34 38 52 43 42 
No. of  
Member states 10 12 12 15 25 25 27 
Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009). 
Table 1 also displays that the size of the EP committees has increased over the time. 
Average committee size rose from 31 members in the 1
st
 EP to 52 members in the 5
th
 EP. 
However, in the 6
th
 EP, the average committee size decreased to 43 members and in the 
current 7
th
 EP, the average committee size is 42 members. Although average committee size 
has varied over time, sizes vary even more significantly across committees within the same 
parliamentary term. For example, in the current 7
th
 EP the Legal Affairs committee and 
Fisheries committee is composed of mere 25 members whereas the Foreign Affairs committee 
has 75 members. 
The importance of the committee system is underlined by a survey of MEPs in 2010. When 
asked to choose their first preference from among the EP posts of Group President, National 
Delegation Leader, President of the EP or Committee Chair, more respondents opted for a EP 
committee chair rather than any of the other alternatives (Farrell et al. 2011).
10
 Thus, MEPs 
clearly value committee posts and consider that the EP committees are important arenas of 
power that matters to the legislate process within the EP (McElroy 2006:8).  
3.1.1 The committee assignment system of the EP 
The majority of MEPs serve on one committee as full members and on another as substitutes. 
However, multiple memberships are possible since the number of available committee seats 
always exceeds the number of parliamentarians (see Table 1) and not all MEPs are members 
in a committee. Officially, committee seats are assigned in a plenary vote every two and a half 
years. However, in practice, they are distributed before the plenary stage (Bowler and Farrell 
                                                 
10
 Of the respondents, 33% opted for committee chair as their first preference, compared with 29% opting for 
what would apparently seem to be the most prestigious parliamentary post, the presidency of the Parliament. 
Only 21% opted for leadership of their political group or leading their national delegation. (Farrell et al. 2011) 
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1995:226; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003:338). The only reference in the EP Rules of 
Procedure states that:  
Members of committees and committees of inquiry shall be elected after nominations 
have been submitted by the political groups and the non-attached Members. The 
Conference of Presidents shall submit proposals to Parliament. The composition of the 
committees shall, as far as possible, reflect the composition of Parliament. (Rule 186; EP, 
2013) 
The leaders of the EP party groups, together with the President of the EP, constitute the 
Conference of Presidents, which for each committee propose the number of seats and the 
allocation of seats between the EP party groups according to the political composition of the 
plenary, using the D'Hondt method. Thus, seats are allocated to the EP party groups 
proportionally to their size in the plenary. Thereafter, it is the EP party groups that internally 
decide on individual assignments, taking into consideration the sizes and wishes of their 
constituent national party delegation (Yordanova 2009:257)  
The EP party groups do not apply any formal rules in the selection process, and past 
research on the 6
th
 EP has revealed some differences in the procedure in the different groups. 
For example, in the big groups (Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) 
and European Democrats, and Group of the Party of European Socialists), seats are first 
distributed among the national party delegations and thereafter, individual seats are allocated 
within respective delegation. In the Liberal group (Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe), the procedure is instead that each national delegation shall be allowed 
one committee seat, and then if there are any seats left, delegations can have another. 
Subsequently, once members have expressed their preferences for committee membership, the 
distribution of seats is done by the Bureau of the group. In the Green group (Group of the 
Greens/European Free Alliance) it is instead almost solely the members’ individual interests 
that decide the assignment of seats in the committees. (Yordanova 2009:257)   
To summaries, the above overview of the EP committee system shows that the range of the 
EP committees has expanded gradually since the 1
st
 EP. Moreover, the majority of the MEPs 
are full members in one committee, and although the EP committees are important areas in 
which MEPs can exercise power within the EP, there are no formal rules that require that the 
composition of women and men in the EP committees should reflect the composition of 
women and men in the overall plenary. After the Conference of Presidents has allocated seats 
to the EP party groups according to the political composition of the plenary, the informal rules 
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of the EP party groups determine individual committee assignments. As displayed above, 
these rules have shown to differ in different EP party groups. The question is thus what lays 
besides the formal and informal rules, hence, which factors that affect individual EP 
committee assignments. In the following section the relevant literature on EP committee 
assignments will be reviewed. It will be shown that although past studies on EP committee 
assignments have puzzled out some of the factors affecting individual committee assignments, 
no study has so far fully explored the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members 
to the EP committees. 
3.2 Literature on the EP committee assignments  
Due to the similarities between the EP and the United State (US) Congress
11
, a strong 
committee system twinned with relatively undisciplined parties in a legislature with no 
government resting on a vote of no confidence (Yoshinaka et al. 2010:458), previous research 
on EP committee assignments has to a large extended relied on the theoretical literature on the 
US legislature (Yordanova 2011:599f). In line with this literature, the majority of previous 
studies have asked question in relation to the predictions of either distribution, informational 
or partisan theory. Thus examined if MEPs join EP committees in order to: exercise 
distortional influence over the policy area they serve, enhance the EPs efficiency by serving 
the informational needs of the plenary, or if the control over committee assignments lays in 
hands of the EP party group leaders.  
Bowler and Farrell (1995) found from their groundbreaking study on the 3
rd
 EP (1989-
1994), evidence that identified occupational and interests group attachments as “the only 
consistently significant determinants driving committee membership.” (Bowler and Farrell 
1995:234) Similarly, McElroy (2006) showed that policy expertise played a role in the 
assignment of members to the committees on Legal Affairs, Environment and Public Health 
and Industry in the 5
th
 EP (1999-2004), suggesting that MEPs with relevant policy expertise 
or links to relevant interests groups are more likely than others to obtain an assignment in, at 
least, those committees. Further, Yordanova (2009) also found, in her study on the 6
th
 EP 
(2004-2009), support for the importance of relevant expertise and interests for assignments to 
a wide range of committees. Yordanova showed that MEPs with relevant expertise were more 
likely to join committees that require technical knowledge, and that MEPs with special 
interests where more likely to join a committee whose area of operation addressed their 
                                                 
11
 For a deeper discussion on the similarities between the EP and the US Congress, see McElroy (2007). 
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interests. Additionally, Bowler and Farrell, McElroy and Yordanova all concluded in their 
studies that the composition of the EP committees, with minor expectations, were largely 
proportional to the partisan and national composition of the plenary. 
To summarize, much of the previous research on committee assignments in the EP 
suggests that MEPs´ expertise and personal interests may be good predictors of committee 
assignments. As the 2010 survey of MEPs in the current 7
th
 EP (2009- ) has shown, the most 
important factor affecting MEPs´ committee assignments are: the importance of the issues 
that a committee covers (47.5%) and their professional expertise (45.5%), followed by their 
personal interests (38.4%) (Farrell et al. 2011).
12
 However, although past studies have largely 
deepened and increased our knowledge about the organizational principles of the EP 
committees and provided some answers to the question of which factors that affect individual 
EP committee assignments, the whole rationale behind, is still not clear. As Chapter 2 
showed, research on women´s representation in the EP committees has to date, even by 
feminist explorations, been largely neglected. Consequently, no study has so far fully 
explored the impact of sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP committees.  
There are at least to two explanations for this. First, the theoretical literature on the US 
legislature does not treat sex as an important and prominent factor of individual committee 
assignments. Second, the EP is at the supranational level, while the feminist models of 
legislative organizational have been developed at the national level, an added difficulty in 
applying models on the national level to the EP, is that the EP has no other supranational 
comparator. Thus, when applying models developed at the national level to the EP, a series of 
methodological problems arises, for example, the EP operates, in difference to national 
parliaments, in a multi-nation, multi-party EP setting with MEPs with strong electoral 
dependence on their national parties (Yordanova 2009:261). But in order to develop the 
knowledge of women´s representation in the EP committees and fully examine the impact of 
sex on the assignment of individual members to the EP committees, feminist theories of 
legislative organization needs to be tested on the EP committees.  
Furthermore, although the feminists theories are developed at the national level, the 
adaptability of the feminist theories to the EP can still be very fruitful, since the feminist 
theories solely suggest that the composition of, and assignments to, parliamentary committees 
                                                 
12
 Of the respondents, 47.5% opted for the importance of the issues that the committee covers as extremely 
important for committee choice, 45.5% opted for their professional expertise, 38.4% opted for their personal 
interests, 34.5% opted for the importance to their voters, 12.5% opted for previous membership in the last EP, 
7.4% opted for being asked by their national party and 6.9% opted for being asked by their EP party group 
(Farrell et al. 2011). 
16 
 
can be explain by gender-roles, hence, of what can be expected being “female” or “male” 
policy areas (Wängnerud 1999).
13
 Thus, the differences can therefore serve as a basis for 
discussion of the explanatory power and adaptability of the feminist theories to the 
supranational context. Another factor which enable the adaptability the feminist theories to 
the EP is that all direct elected EPs are included in this thesis, thus by including all direct 
elected EPs, it is possible to compare the different EPs with each other and see if any patterns 
emerges in the data that can be generalized on future EPs.     
In the following section, the feminist theories of legislative organization will be presented, 
followed by a classification of the EP committees and the derived hypotheses. However, first, 
it needs to be discussed how this thesis relates to the concepts of “female” and “male” policy 
areas, a discussion which we now turn to.  
3.3 Application of feminist theories of legislative organization 
to the EP 
Feminist theories of legislative organization suggest that policy areas are linked to gender-
roles. That some policy areas are linked to what can be seen as “female” while other policy 
areas are linked to what can be seen as “male”. Thus, suggesting that is exist a gendered 
division between different policy areas, hence a division between “female” policy areas and 
“male” policy areas.  
However, the usage of the labels “female” and “male” in relation to different policy areas 
are not without problems. ”Female” and “male” are vague concepts and every attempt to 
categorize policy areas on the basis of them, runs the risk to reproduce preconceptions about 
the different sexes. Hence, the aim here is not to define which policy areas that is ”female” or 
“male”, through some, for example, ide about sameness or difference between the sexes. The 
categorization that is made is merely to test feminist research of legislative organization on 
the EP committees, and not to comment about ”female” or “male” per se.  
The following parts of this section will be presented as followed. First, previous research 
on women´s representation in parliamentary committees will be presented. Thereafter, a new 
classification of the EP committees based on the concept pair reproduction/production will be 
proposed, followed by the derived hypotheses and a discussion on the control variables 
included in this study.  
                                                 
13
 For a different view see Heath et al. (2005).  
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3.3.1 Female and male policy areas 
Previous empirical studies on women´s representation in parliamentary committees have 
shown that women, once they have been elected to Parliaments, often are found to be 
concentrated in certain types of committees. More specific, in committees that are concerned 
with issues related to what can be classified as typical “female” policy areas.  
Some of the first researchers that drew attention to this phenomenon were the authors to 
the book Unfinished Democracy – Women in Nordic Politics, in which the authors, among 
other things, studied the composition of women and men in the Nordic countries
14
 
parliamentary committees, from the 1960s to the 1980s. The authors found that women 
parliamentarians often were seated in social affairs and education committees and held up a 
significant lower number of seats in finance and economy committees. Hence, the author 
concluded that women were allocated seats to committees dealing with issues connected with 
the traditional women´s role and that men were assigned to committees focusing on issues 
that have traditionally fallen within the men´s sphere. (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985) 
The same pattern was later found by other feminist researchers. Thomas (1994), which is a 
pioneer of empirical research on sex and committee assignments, showed, in her study on the 
U.S state-level where she followed the development overtime, that women were significantly 
overrepresented in social political committees, traditionally “female-oriented” committees and 
underrepresented in committees that were concerned with business and private economy, 
traditionally “male-oriented” committees. Thomas showed that women representatives, in the 
1970s, were concentrated in a narrow set of committee assignments, usually education 
committees. However, in 1988 this situation had changed, and women were found in all of the 
committees, although the proportion of women and men were not equal in all types of 
committees. Thomas found that women were significantly more likely to sit on health care 
and welfare committees than men, and less likely than men, to sit on committees dealing with 
business and private economic concerns. Further, the pattern was similar when Thomas broke 
down the aggregated data by state. In eleven out of twelve states, women were found more 
often than men on health care and welfare committees. In contrast, in nine of twelve states, 
women were less often than men found in business committees. (Thomas 1994:65f)  
Similarly, Wängnerud (1999) found, in her study of the Swedish Parliament from 1971 to 
1996, where she focused on committee assignments to the standing committees that women 
parliamentarians were overrepresented and underrepresented in different types of committees. 
                                                 
14
 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.  
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In her study, Wängnerud classified the committees based on the concept pair 
reproduction/production, on what can be expected being female and male, creating four 
groups in which the committees were placed in: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions 
and Economic Technic. Wängnerud found that women more often were assigned to 
committees in the Social welfare and Culture/Law group, than men. In contrast, men were 
more often than women assigned to committees in the Basic functions and Economic/Technic 
group. However, Social welfare and Economic/Technic were the two most sex characterized 
groups, where in the former women were most overrepresented and in the latter most 
underrepresented. Wängnerud concluded that there existed a clear sex-pattern, and suggested 
that the differences in the compositions of women and men in the different groups were 
dependent on which policy areas the committees was concerned with, that is, typical “female-
oriented” policy areas or typical “male-oriented” policy areas. However, Wängnerud also 
concluded that the pattern was decreasing over time and that it in the 1994 election was 
broken. In a later study of the Swedish Parliament, Wängnerud (2009) confirmed this 
conclusion, when she found that women only were underrepresented, occupying less than 40 
percent of the seats, in one of the standing committees, namely the committee on social 
insurance, a formerly heavily “female” dominated policy area (Wängnerud 2009:61). 
To summarize, previous research has shown that women parliamentarians more often than 
men parliamentarians, are seated in committees concerned with issues connected to typical 
“female-oriented” policy areas. The other side of the coin is that men parliamentarians more 
often than women parliamentarians are seated in committees that are concerned with issues 
focusing on typical “male-oriented” policy areas. The question is thus if the same pattern can 
be found in the EP committees.  
3.3.2 Classification of the EP Committees  
In order to make visible which of the EP committees that is expected to be concerned with 
typical “female-oriented” or typical “male-oriented” policy areas, the EP committees need to 
be classified. Here, the classification scheme of Wängnerud (1999) will be used and the 
following categorization of the EP committees will thus depart from the concept pair 
reproduction/production.  
A continuum between reproduction and production  
Reproduction and production represents two extreme values on a continuum between of what 
can be expected being “female” and “male”, and are commonly used concepts when women´s 
19 
 
and men´s different positions in the society are analyzed (Rhode 1992:157; Wängnerud 
1999:62). Reproduction refers to what in a broad sense can be said being caring tasks in the 
society: care of children and old, care of sick people etc. Traditionally, reproduction has been 
a “female” responsibility area and it has also been an area that to a great extent been 
connected to the family and the private sphere. Production, on the other hand, refers to what 
in a broad sense can be said being the society´s production of goods, and has in another way 
been connected to the public sphere. It has also, traditionally, been a “male” responsibility 
area.  
The EP committees have been divided into the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, 
Basic functions and Economic/Technic. The Social welfare and Economic/Technic groups 
represented the two extremities (see Wängnerud 1999:62f). The EP committees that are 
expected to be concerned with typical “female-oriented” policy areas have been place in the 
Social welfare group, while the EP committees that are expected to be concerned with typical 
“male-oriented” policy areas have been placed in the Economic/Technic group. The EP 
committees placed in the two groups in the middle, Culture/Law and Basic functions are 
expected to be concern with less gender characterized policy areas.  
Thus, the EP committees that have been placed in the Social welfare group are concerned 
with social welfare policies, such as employment and social affairs policies etc., policies 
which are seen as typical “female”, while the EP committees that have been placed in the 
Economic/Technic group are concerned with economic and technic policies, such as 
international trade and budgets policies etc., policies which are seen as typical “male”. The EP 
committees placed in the Culture/Law group are concerned with culture and law policies, 
such as civil liberties, justice and home affairs policies etc., policies that are seen as more 
“female” than “male”, but not as gendered as the social welfare policies. Finally, the EP 
committees placed in the Basic function group are concerned with policies connected to the 
basic functions of the EU, such as regional development policies etc., policies that are seen as 
more “male” than “female”, but not as gendered as the economic and technic policies. 
The dimension between reproduction and production is illustrated in Table 2. Table 2 also 
shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and 
Economic/Technic, the different EP committees have been placed in. However, the 
classification offered in Table 2, only show the classification of the EP in the 6
th
 and 7
th
 EP, 
for the classification of the EP committees in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 EP see Appendix 2. 
In Table 2, there is also a description of the different EP committees´ responsibilities. The 
description is to enable a critical assessment of the classification that has been made. 
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Although the following classification of the EP committees was the one who was found to be 
most justified, one must still be aware that the classification probably will affect the study´s 
results.  
Table 2: Classification of the EP committees based on a continuum between reproduction and 
production and a description of the EP committees responsibilities  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development 
 Employment and 
Social Affairs 
 Environment, Public 
Health and Food 
Safety  
 Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection 
 Women´s Rights and 
Gender Equality 
 Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home 
Affairs  
 Constitutional Affairs 
 Culture and 
Education 
 Legal Affairs 
 Petitions 
 Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
 Fisheries  
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional 
Development 
 Transport and 
Tourism 
 Budgets  
 Budgetary Control 
 Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
 Industry, Research 
and Energy 
 International Trade 
Social welfare: Employment and Social Affairs committee is responsible for employment policy and all aspects of social policy; 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee is responsible for environmental policy and public health and food 
safety issues; Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee is responsible for coordination at Community level of 
national legislation and protection of the economic interests of consumers; Development committee is responsible for the, 
implementation and monitoring of the development and cooperation policy of the EU;  Women´s Rights and Gender Equality 
committee is responsible for the definition, promotion and protection of women's rights in the EU and related Community 
measures.  
Culture/Law: Culture and Education committee is responsible for the cultural aspects of the EU and the EU's education policy; 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee is responsible for the protection within the territory of the EU of citizens' 
rights, human rights and fundamental rights, including the protection of minorities; Legal Affairs committee is responsible for 
the interpretation and application of European law, compliance of EU acts with primary law; Constitutional Affairs committee is 
responsible or  the institutional aspects of the European integration process; Petitions committee is responsible for petitions 
and relations with the European Ombudsman. 
Basic functions: Transport and Tourism committee is responsible for matters relating to the development of a common policy 
for inter alia rail, road, and air transport and tourism; Agriculture and Rural Development committee is responsible for the 
operation and development of the common agricultural policy and rural development; Fisheries committee is responsible for 
the operation and development of the common fisheries policy and the conservation of fishery resources; Regional 
Development committee is responsible for regional and cohesion policy; Foreign Affairs committee is responsible for the 
common foreign and security policy and the European security and defense policy.  
Economic/Technic: International Trade committee is responsible for matters relating to the implementation of the Union's 
common commercial policy and its external economic relations; Economic and Monetary Affairs committee  is responsible for 
the economic and monetary policies of the EU; Budgets committee is responsible for the multiannual financial framework of the 
EU revenue and expenditure; Industry, Research and Energy committee is responsible for the EU's industrial policy and the 
application of new technologies; Budgetary Control committee is responsible for  the control of the implementation of the 
budget of the EU and of the European Development Fund. 
Source: The official EP website.  
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3.3.3 Hypotheses 
In the outset of this thesis, the two broad research questions to be answered were stipulated: 
are women MEPs more or less commonly found in certain types of EP committees?; and does 
sex have an impact on the assignment of individual members to EP committees? Derived from 
the feminist theory of legislative organization, the following set of hypotheses will more 
precisely be employed in the analysis trying to answer the research questions. The first set of 
hypotheses (H1a and H2b) will be employed in an answering the first research question and 
the second set of hypotheses (H2a, H2b, H2c and H2d) will be employed in answering the 
second research question.  
From overrepresented to underrepresented 
Linking the feminist research on legislative organization to the classification of the EP 
committees offered in Table 2, it is tested whether the two extremities groups, Social welfare 
and Economic/Technic, are more sex characterized then the two groups in the middle, 
Culture/Law and Basic functions. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Women MEPs are more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group 
than in EP committees in the Culture/Law group.  
 
H1b: Women MEPs are more underrepresented in EP committees in the Economic/Technic 
group than in EP committees in the Basic functions group.  
EP committee assignments on the individual level 
Although women MEPs may be more or less overrepresented or underrepresented in the 
different groups, it is still needed to be tested if sex has an impact on the individual 
assignments to the EP committees. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
H2a: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
increased by being a woman. 
 
H2b: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group is 
neither increased nor decreased by being a woman. 
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H2c: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions groups is 
neither decreased nor increased by being a woman. 
 
H2d: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is 
decreased by being a woman. 
3.3.4 Control variabels 
The above hypotheses examine a bivariate relationship between sex and EP committee 
assignments, and although a bivariate relationship in an uncontrolled setting is suboptimal, it 
is not useless. By examine the relationship between two variables, an independent variable 
and a dependent variable, it is possible to establish if it exists an association, and if it does, the 
strengthen and direction of the association between the two variables can be determined 
(Bryman 2008:325f) Consequently, having a model with only sex as a predictor of EP 
committee assignments will enable to establish if it exists an association, and if so, the 
strengthen and direction of the association can be determined. Thus, this study´s intention is 
not to establish the whole rationale behind EP committee assignments by puzzling out all the 
factors affecting it. Instead, the intention is merely to examine the relationship between sex 
and individual assignments to EP committees, in order to establish if sex has, or has not, an 
impact.  
However, it is also true that having a model with some control variables is better, as it 
allows an association to be controlled for spurious correlation, and specifies different 
conditions under which the original bivariate relationship might hold (Bryman 2008:330f). In 
the review of the literature on women´s descriptive representation in Chapter 2, it was shown 
that political parties have found to be an important factor in explaining the number of women 
parliamentarians, as parties on the left tend to send more women to Parliament (Wängnerud 
2009:54ff), although previous research on EP committee assignments have thus found that the 
composition of the EP committees, with minor expectations, were largely proportional to the 
partisan composition of the plenary. However, the EP party groups are still important factors 
in the assignment process to EP committees and therefore, EP party group will be included in 
this study as a control variable. Additionally, by including EP party group as a control 
variable, it will also be able to see if previous researchers´ observation that the compositions 
of the EP committees, with minor expectations are largely proportional to the partisan 
composition of the plenary holds, in this thesis new classification of the EP committees. 
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 Furthermore, in the review, it was also shown that other factors, such as the electoral 
system, economic development, secularization and the level of gender-equality, all have 
found to have an impact on the number of women elected to Parliament. By including 
nationality as a control variable in this study, all of these factors above will thus be controlled 
for, due to the fact that variable nationality includes all the above factors. Although it will not 
in this study be evident which of the above factors that might have an effect on the dependent 
variables since the factors are not examined separately. Additionally, including nationality as 
a control variable will also enable to see if previous researchers´ observation that the 
compositions of the EP committees, with minor expectations are largely proportional to the 
national composition of the plenary holds, in this thesis new classification of the EP 
committees. A more detailed discussion of the usage of the control variables will be provided 
in the following Methodology chapter (Chapter 4).   
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4 Methodology 
In this chapter, the collection and usage of the data employed in this study will be presented. 
In the first part, a review of the data collection process precedes a presentation of the coding 
of the variables. Thereafter, in the second part, the statistical tools which will be employed to 
test the derived hypotheses will be presented and argued for. First, the statistical tool cross 
tabulation, which will be used to test the 1
st
 set of hypotheses will be presented. Thereafter, 
the statistical tool logistic regression, which will be used to test the 2
nd
 set of hypotheses, will 
be presented and the construction of the models will be explained. 
4.1 Data and measures 
The data for this thesis consists of both an original and a secondary dataset. The original 
dataset contains of data on the MEPs in the second term of the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 and 7
th
 EP 
and the secondary data set contains of data on the MEPs in the first term of the 6
th
 EP. The 
data is on the individual level.  
The original dataset were collected from the official EP website. All MEPs have been 
coded manually by going through the lists of MEPs in the different EPs. The data on the 
MEPs in the 7
th
 EP were collected in August 2012 and the data on the MEPs in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 
4
th
 and 5
th
 EP were collected from February to April 2013. The secondary dataset consist of 
Yordanova´s (2009) replication data. The dataset was used by Yordanova in an article 
published in European Union Politics journal and the replication data is available online. 
However, as the data collection for the original dataset has been carried out manually, it is 
possible that occasional coding errors occur in the original dataset. 
Together, the original and secondary data sets include data on the individual level of  the 
MEPs in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
, 6
th
 and 7
th 
EP. The codebook is provided in Appendix 4.  
4.1.1 The dependent variables  
The dependent variables are actual EP committee membership. More specific, membership in 
an EP committee in a named group, that is, in the Social welfare group, Culture/Law group, 
Basic functions group or Economic/Technic group, coded as 1 for being member in an EP 
committee in a named group and 0 otherwise. The dependent variables are thus coded in four 
separate binary variables.  
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An alternative way to code EP committee membership in a named group, could have been 
to code it in one nominal variable (e.g. Social welfare = 1, Culture/Law = 2, Basic functions 
=3, Economic/Technic = 4). However, coding membership that way require that the MEPs 
solely are members in a EP committee in one of the groups, and as some MEPs are members 
in a EP committee in two or more groups, coding EP committee membership in a named 
group in one dependent variable is thus not possible.  
4.1.2 The independent variable 
The independent variable is the MEPs sex. With sex refers here to the legal sex, which in this 
thesis is restricted to only two sexes, woman and man. Women MEPs are coded as 0 and men 
MEPs are coded as 1.  
4.1.3 The control variables 
The control variable nationality is coded in a series of dummy variables, coded as 1 for being 
from a named member state and 0 otherwise. For example, MEPs from Sweden are coded as 
1, while MEPs from another member state are coded as 0, MEPs from Spain are coded as 1, 
while MEPs from another member state are coded as 0, and so on for all member states. The 
United Kingdom will be used as reference group in the logistic regressions.  
The control variable EP party group is also coded in a series of dummy variables. 
However, since many of the EP party groups change their name over the examined time span, 
and some smaller EP party groups only exists under one or two parliamentary terms, the EP 
party groups has been classified into five categories, depending on their ideological 
affiliation. The classification scheme of Hix et al. (2009) has been used to classify the 
different EP party groups.   
The EP party groups have been classified into the five categories: Radical left, where the 
EP party groups with radical left ideological affiliations been placed; Socialists, where the EP 
party groups with socialist ideological affiliations been placed; Liberals, where the EP party 
groups with liberal ideological affiliations been placed; Conservatives, where the EP party 
groups with conservative ideological affiliations been placed; and Others, where the smaller 
EP party groups and none-attached members been placed. The coding of the EP party group 
variable is the same as for the control variable nationality. The group Others will be used as 
reference group in the logistic regressions. See Appendix 3 for the classification of the EP 
party groups.  
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4.2 Statistical tools 
To test the hypotheses derived from the feminist theory of legislative organization, the 
statistical tools cross tabulation and logistic regression will be used. The tests will be run in 
SPSS.  
4.2.1 Cross tabulation  
The statistical tool employed to test Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b is cross tabulation of 
the independent variable sex with the dependent variables, membership in an EP committee in 
a named group. The cross tabulations will provide an comparisons of the observed percentage 
of women MEPs in the different groups and it is therefore reasonable to use the average 
percentage of women in all EP committees as reference point.
15
 An underrepresentation of 
women will thus mean that the percentage of women MEPs in a certain group is lower than 
the average percentage of women in all EP committees. The other way around, an 
overrepresentation of women will occur when the percentage of women in a certain group is 
higher than the average percentage of women in all EP committees.  
4.2.2 Logistic regression  
Due to the fact that the dependent variables are binary, the statistical tool logistic regression 
will be used to test Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d.  
There are two main uses of logistic regression: 1) prediction of group membership, since 
logistic regression calculates the probability that an event will occur; and 2) examine the 
relationship and strengths among variables, e.g. being a woman MEP puts you at a higher 
probability to be assigned to an EP committee in a named group, than being a man MEP. 
(Menard 2010:14ff) However, due to the fact that logistic regression calculates the changes in 
the log odds of the dependent variable, and not changes in the value of the dependent variable 
as ordinary least square (OLS) regression does, the b coefficients in logistic regression are 
reported as log odds, which are not as easy too interpreted as the b coefficients in OLS 
regression. But not to make the interpretation of the b coefficients too complicated, all the 
reader needs to be concerned with is if the b coefficients have a positive or a negative value. 
A more detailed review of how the b coefficients should be interpreted will be presented in 
the following Results chapter (Chapter 5).  
                                                 
15
 Compare the design used by Wängnerud (1999) and Thomas (1994).  
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Construction of models  
To fully examine the relationship between the sex and the dependents variables, four separate 
models will be constructed.  
In Model 1 the relationship between sex and the dependent variables will be examined. In 
other words, the bivariate relationship between sex and the dependent variables will be 
examined in Model 1, which will enable to establish if it exists an association, and if it does, 
the strengthen and direction of the association will thereafter be determined. In Model 2 the 
relationship between sex, the dependent variables and the control variables will be examined. 
Hence, if an association is found in Model 1, the association will, in Model 2, be controlled 
for spurious correlation, and it will also be specified under which conditions which the 
original bivariate relationship holds.  
Further, the control variables nationality and EP party group can both have a direct effect 
on the dependent variables, which is controlled for in Model 2, and a simultaneous effect 
depending whether an MEP are a woman or a man. That is, the effect of the control variables 
might differ depending on the value of the independent variable. For example, being a woman 
MEP from a certain member state or being a woman MEP from a certain EP party group 
might higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in a certain group. 
Hence, the control variables might interact with the independent variable, and these variables 
are known as interaction variables.  
In Model 3, the relationship between sex, nationality and the interaction variables of these 
on the depended variables will be examined. Hence, it will examined if being a woman MEP 
from certain member state higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in 
a certain group. In Model 4, the relationship between sex, EP party group and the interaction 
variables of these on the depended variables will be examined. Here, it will instead be 
examined if being a woman MEP from a certain EP party group higher or lower the likelihood 
to be assigned to an EP committee in a certain group. 
Model 3 and Model 4 are thus not constructed on the basis of testing Hypothesis 2a, 
Hypothesis 2b, Hypothesis 2c and Hypothesis 2d, since they are not derived from the feminist 
theories of legislative organization. As shown in Chapter 3, the feminist theories of legislative 
organization are developed on the national level, which means that they do not include 
nationality or EP party groups as prominent factors affecting committee assignments. 
However, previous studies on women´s descriptive representation have shown that political 
parties are important factors when explaining the number of women parliamentarians, as 
parties on the left tend to send more women to parliament. Hence, it is therefore interesting to 
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examine if the impact of sex on the dependent variables differ depending on which EP party 
group an MEP is member in. Further, other factors which also have been outlined as 
prominent on the number of women elected to parliament are the electoral system, economic 
development, secularization and the level of gender-equality in a nation, and it is therefore 
interesting to examine if the effect of sex on the dependent variables differ depending on 
which member state an MEP are from. Model 3 and Model 4 are thus constructed on the basis 
to see if there might be any interesting inductive findings in the data, which can be used to 
further develop the feminist theories of organization to the supranational level.  
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5 Results 
In this chapter the results of the statistical tests will be presented and analyzed. In the first 
part, the results from the cross tabulations will be reported and it will be made cleared if the 
different hypotheses in the 1
st
 set of hypotheses are accepted or rejected. Thereafter, in the 
second part, the results from the logistic regressions will be reported and it will be cleared if 
the different hypotheses in the 2
nd
 set of hypotheses are accepted or rejected.  
5.1 Where are the women? 
In Table 3 the cross tabulations of sex and the dependent variables are presented. Table 3 
displays the percentage of women within each of the Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic 
functions and Economic/Technic groups, and a measure that compare the percentage of 
women within each group, with the average percentage of women in all the EP committees 
(comparison measure). A plus sign means an overrepresentation of women and a minus sign 
means an underrepresentation of women. 
Table 3: Cross tabulations of sex and membership in an EP Committee in a named group 
 Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic Average 
EP % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % 
1
st 
(1979-1984) 
29 +12 12 -5 13 -4 13 -4 17 
2
nd 
(1984-1989) 
38 +21 15 -2 9 -8 11 -6 17 
3
nd 
(1989-1994) 
46 +24 20 -2 12 -10 16 -6 22 
4
th 
(1994-1999) 
42 +16 30 +4 18 -8 25 -1 26 
5
th 
(1999-2004) 
50 +22 29 +1 20 -8 25 -3 28 
6
th 
(2004-2009) 
46 +16 34 +4 22 -8 28 -2 30 
7
th 
(2009- ) 
49 +14 37 +2 27 -8 31 -4 35 
Note: The comparison measure compare the average percentage of women in respective group with the average percentage of 
women in all the EP committees.  (+)-signs means that women been overrepresented in relation to the average percentage, (-)-
signs means that women been underrepresented in relation to the average percentage. Sources: The official EP website and 
Yordanova (2009).  
The results of the cross tabulations displayed in Table 3 show that the composition of women 
and men varies in the different groups. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, women have been 
more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP committees in 
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the Culture/Law group. Hence, women have been overrepresented with 12 percentage points 
of as lowest (in the 1
st
 EP) and 24 percentage points as highest (in the 3
rd
 EP) in the Social 
welfare group, whilst women been overrepresented with 4 percentage points as highest (in the 
4
th
 and 6
th
 EP) in the Culture/Law group. The finding thus confirm previous observations of 
Wängnerud (1999) of a more significant overrepresentation of women parliamentarians in 
committees the Social welfare group than in the Culture/Law group.  
A somewhat unexpected finding is, however, that women in the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 EP were not 
overrepresented but underrepresented in the Culture/Law group. In the first three EPs, the 
results in Table 3 show a pattern of an underrepresentation of women in the Culture/Law 
group. Although, in the 4
th
 EP, the pattern was inversely, and since then, there is instead a 
pattern of an overrepresentation of women in the Culture/Law group. This finding is, to some 
extent, divergent to the observations of Wängnerud (1999) of a clear pattern of an 
overrepresentation of women parliamentarians in the Culture/Law group.  
Leaving Hypothesis 1a and instead turning our attention to Hypothesis 1b. The results in 
Table 3 show that women have been more underrepresented in EP committees in the Basic 
functions group than in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group, thus contradicting 
Hypothesis 1b. In the 1
st
 EP, women were underrepresented with the same percentage points 
(-4 percentage points) in the Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group. But 
since the 2
nd
 EP, women have been more underrepresented in the Basic functions group than 
in the Economic/Technic group. Hence, women MEPs have been underrepresented with 8 
percentage points as lowest (in the 2
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
, 6
th
 and 7
th
 EP) and 10 percentage points as 
highest (in the 3
rd
 EP) in the Basic functions group. In the Economic/Technic group, women 
have been underrepresented with 7 percentage points as highest (in the 2
nd
 EP). Hence, the 
results in Table 3 show that there is a pattern of an underrepresentation of women in both the 
Economic/Technic group and in the Basic functions group in all EPs. Although the 
underrepresentation of women has been greatest in the Basic functions group, except in the 1
st
 
EP. This finding is thus divergent to Wängnerud´s (1999), observation that women 
parliamentarians are more underrepresented in the Economic/Technic group than in the Basic 
functions group.  
However, one methodological problem that the coding of the depended variables induces 
in the above results is that an MEP only can be counted once in the different groups. Thus, in 
the results in Table 3, it has not been taken into consideration that a MEP can occupy more 
than one seat in EP committees in a named group, and as a result, the results in Table 3 does 
not display the actual percentage of seats occupied by women within each of the Social 
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welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic groups, or the actual average 
percentage of seats occupied by women in all EP committees. The results in Table 3 have 
therefore been controlled for the actual number of seats occupied by women in the different 
groups. Table 4 displays the percentage of seats occupied by women within each of the Social 
welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and Economic/Technic groups, and a measure that 
compare the percentage of seats occupied by women within each group with the average 
percentage of seats occupied by women in all EP committees (comparison measure). A plus 
sign means an overrepresentation of women and a minus sign means an underrepresentation 
of women.  
Table 4: Cross tabulations of sex and number of seats in an EP committee in a named group 
 Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic Average 
EP % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % Cf. % 
1
st 
(1979-1984)
 
29 +12 11 -6 13 -4 13 -4 17 
2
nd 
(1984-1989) 
45 +28 17 0 9 -8 10 -7 17 
3
nd 
(1989-1994) 
49 +27 18 -4 12 -10 17 -5 22 
4
th 
(1994-1999) 
44 +18 29 +3 18 -8 25 -1 26 
5
th 
(1999-2004) 
51 +23 28 0 20 -8 25 -3 28 
6
th 
(2004-2009) 
48 +18 34 +4 22 -8 27 -3 30 
7
th 
(2009- ) 
51 +16 39 +4 27 -8 30 -5 35 
Note: The comparison measure compare the average percentage of seats occupied by women in respective group with the 
average percentage of seats occupied women in all the EP committees.  (+)-signs means that women been overrepresented in 
relation to the average percentage, (-)-signs means that women been underrepresented in relation to the average percentage. 
Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009). 
The results in Table 4 more or less coincides the results displayed in Table 3.
16
 One thing 
worth noting though is that the composition of women and men in the Culture/Law group is 
even more less sex characterized in Table 4. Hence, the results in Table 4 show no pattern of 
an underrepresentation or an overrepresentation of women. Again this finding is, to some 
extent, divergent to Wängnerud´s (1999) observation of a clear pattern an overrepresentation 
of women parliamentarians in the Culture/Law group.  
                                                 
16
 Since the number seats in the EP committees vary between the different EPs and hence even greater within the 
same EP (see Chapter 3). The results displayed in Table 4 have been controlled for the number of seats in the 
different groups, by an examination of the difference between the observed and the expected number of seats per 
woman MEP based on the average percentage of seats occupied by women MEPs in all the EP committees. The 
results from the examination coincided with the results displayed in table 4 (See appendix 5). 
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5.1.1 Summary 
The main result of the analysis is that: women have been more overrepresented in EP 
committees in the Social welfare group than in EP committees in the Culture/Law group, in 
all EPs; and that women been more underrepresented in EP committees in the Basic functions 
group than in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group, in all EPs except for the 1
st
 EP. 
The finding thus implies that Hypothesis 1a is accepted and that Hypothesis 2a is rejected. A 
summary of the 1
st
 set of hypotheses is displayed in Table 5. 
The two groups that thus appear to be most sex characterized are the Social welfare group 
and the Basic functions group, which is, to some extent, divergent from Wängnerud´s (1999) 
observation that women are most overrepresented in the Social welfare group and most 
underrepresented in the Economic/Technic group. But before a deeper discussion regarding 
which conclusions that can be drawn from these findings, Hypothesis 2a, Hypothesis 2b, 
Hypothesis 2c, and Hypothesis 2d will be tested and the results from the logistic regressions 
will be presented and analyzed. 
Table 5: Summary of the 1
st
 set of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Decision 
H1a: Women MEPs are more overrepresented in EP committees in the Social welfare group than in EP 
committees in the Culture/Law group.  
Accepted 
H1b: Women MEPs are more underrepresented in EP committees in the Economic/Technic group than in 
EP committees in the Basic functions group. 
Rejected 
 
5.2 Does sex matter? 
In the following section, the bivariate relationship between sex and membership in an EP 
committee in a named group will be further examined. By running a series of logistic 
regressions, it will be established if it exist an association between the sex and the dependent 
variables, and if it does, the strength and the direction of the association will be determined.  
For each of the four dependent variables, in each EP, four models will be reported. (Revisit 
Chapter 4 for a thorough review of the variables and models). In Model 1, the relationship 
between sex and the dependent variables will be reported. A negative value for a b coefficient 
signifies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in 
a named group, the opposite holds for a positive value. Further, since the b coefficients do not 
allow the sizes of these effects to be estimated, the predicted probabilities of membership in 
EP committees in a named group for women and men will be reported in Table 13.  
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In Model 2, the relationship between sex, the dependent variables and the control variables 
will be reported. A negative value for the variable sex´s b coefficients signifies a positive 
effect for women on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the 
opposite holds for a positive value. For the control variables´ b coefficients, positive values 
signify a positive effect on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group, the opposite holds for negative values. 
 In Model 3, the relationship between sex, nationality and the interaction variable of these 
on the dependent variables will be reported. A negative value for the variable sex´s b 
coefficients signifies a positive effect for women MEPs from the United Kingdom on the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for a 
positive value. However, it is not possible to foretell if the interaction variables´ b coefficients 
values signify a positive or a negative effect for women from respectively member state on 
the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group by just observing them, 
they need to be recalculated first. How this is done will be made clear in the in the text. 
In Model 4 the relationship between sex, EP party group and the interaction variable of 
these on the dependent variables will be reported. A negative value for the variable sex´s b 
coefficient signifies a positive effect for women MEPs from the Others EP party group on the 
probability of membership in an EP committee in a named group, the opposite holds for 
negative values. However, likewise as above, it is not possible to foretell if the interaction 
variables´ b coefficients values signify a positive or a negative effect for women from 
respectively EP party group on the probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group by just observing them, they need to be recalculated first. How this is done will be 
made clear in the in the text. 
The results from the logistic regressions in the different EPs will be reported and analyzed 
separately, starting with the 1
st
 EP and end with the current 7
th
 EP. In the last part of this 
section, the summary section, the main results of the analysis of the logistic regressions in all 
EPs will be presented and it will be made clear if the different hypotheses are accepted or 
rejected. However, it is now time to turn to the results of the logistic regressions in the 1
st
 EP.    
5.2.1 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 1st EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 1
st
 EP are displayed in Table 6. The results in 
Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group 
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only is significant in the Social welfare group. In the other groups, the effect of sex is not 
significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-.96), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Hence, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 34.8%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
17.0%. That women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social 
welfare group (34.8%>17.0%) are well in line with other researchers´ observations of 
committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 
1994; Wängnerud 1999). However, as mentioned above, sex does not have a significant effect 
on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. Comparing the results in 
Table 6 with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, this finding is not very surprisingly. Although, 
it is divergent to other researchers´ observations that women parliamentarians are significantly 
less likely than men parliamentarians, to sit on committees concerned with business and 
private economic policies (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 
1999). Further, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in 
an EP committee in the Culture/Law group or in the Basic functions group.  
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group is unaffected (b=-.96), when controlling for nationality and EP party 
group. Moreover, the results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group 
have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 1
st
 EP, which is 
consistent with previous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 
2006; Yordanova 2009). 
So far, the results from Model 1 and Model 2 have been analyzed. The main result of the 
analysis is that: sex only is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP 
committee in the Social welfare group, and that women have a higher likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men in the 1
st
 EP. Additionally, 
sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law 
group, in the Basic functions group or in the Economic Technic group, in the 1
st
 EP. Thus, we 
have now come a long way in the analysis process of the results in Table 6, but still, the 
results in Model 3 and Model 4 have not yet been analyzed. Therefore, we now turn to Model 
3 and Model 4, to see if any of the interaction variables are significant.  
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The results form Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are 
significant. The results thus implies that being a women MEP from a certain member state, or 
being a women MEP from certain EP party group does not higher or lower the likelihood to 
be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 1
st
 EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the 
results in Table 6 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in 
the 2
nd
 EP. 
5.2.2 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 2nd EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 2
nd
 EP are displayed in Table 7. The results in 
Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is 
significant in the Social welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the 
Economic/Technic group. In the Culture/Law group, the effect of sex is not significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-1.77), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 58.5%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
19.4%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (58.5%>19.4%). Again, the result is in line with previous observations 
(Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). An interesting remark is 
though, that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
higher for both women (34.8%<58.5%)  and men (17.0%<19.4%) in the 2
nd
 EP, than in the 1
st
 
EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is greater in the 2
nd
 EP than in the 1
st
 EP (b=-1.77>b=-
0.96). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
(b=.89), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 18.3%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
35.4%. That women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic 
functions group (18.3%<35.4%) are divergent to the expected result, but comparing the 
results in Table 7 with the results in Table 3 and Table 4, this result is not all to surprisingly.    
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The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group 
is (b=.68), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women 
will be assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is 20.7%, whilst the 
predicted probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Economic/Technic group is 34.1%. That women are less likely than men to be assigned to an 
EP committee in the Economic/Technic are in line with other researchers´ observations of 
committee assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 
1994; Wängnerud 1999) which hold that women parliamentarians are significantly less likely 
than men parliamentarians, to sit on committees concerned with business and private 
economic policies (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). 
However, an interesting remark is though that the main effect of sex is greater in the Basic 
functions group than in the Economic/Technic group (b=.89>b=.68). Further, in line with the 
expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group. 
 The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the Economic Technic group 
remains significant and that there are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, when 
controlling for nationality and EP party group. An interesting observation in the results in 
Model 2 is though that the main effect of Greece on membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic function group is significant (b=1.14). Thus, the result implies that MEPs from Greece 
have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the United Kingdom to be assigned to an EP 
committee in the Basic functions group. In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP party 
group has any effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks of the finding and 
an additional factor which enhances it is that although the EP were enlarged with two member 
states in the 2
nd
 EP (10 member states in the 1
st
 EP and 12 member states in the 2
nd
 EP), both 
Greece and the United Kingdom were members in the EU in the 1
st
 EP. Thus further analysis 
of the results in the following EPs will expose if this finding is relevant or not. However, 
since only the main effect of Greece is significant
17
, the results in Model 2 implies that neither 
nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of 
the groups in the 2
nd
 EP, which is consistent with previous researchers´ observations (cf. 
Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009). 
                                                 
17
 The only control variable which is significant. 
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In summary, the main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: 
sex is a statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social 
welfare group, in the Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group; and that 
women have a higher likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group, than men, but a lower likelihood than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group and in the Economic/Technic group in the 2
nd
 EP. Additionally, sex 
does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law 
group in the 2
nd
 EP. 
However, before we turn to the 3
rd
 EP, the results from Model 3 and Model 4 needs to be 
analyzed. The results from Model 3 and Model 4 show, as in the 1
st
 EP, that none of the 
interaction variables are significant. Thus, being a women MEP from a certain member state, 
or being a women MEP with a certain partisan affiliation, does not higher or lower the 
likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups, in the 2
nd
 EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the 
results in Table 7 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in 
the 3
rd
 EP. 
5.2.3 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 3rd EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 3
rd
 EP are displayed in Table 8. The results in 
Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is 
significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law 
group and in the Economic Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-1.82), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 60.2%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
19.7%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (60.2%>19.7%), and again, the finding is in line with previous 
researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 
1999). Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group 
is higher for both women (58.5%<60.2%) and men (19.4%<19.7) in the 3
rd
 EP, than in the 2
nd
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EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is greater in the 3
rd
 EP than in the 2
nd
 and 1
st
 EP (b=-
1.82> b=-1.77>b=-0.96). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
(b=.92), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic function group is 18.5%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
36.3%. Hence, women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic 
functions group (18.5%<36.3). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. An 
interesting remark is though that the probability of membership in an EP committee in the 
Basic functions group is higher in the 3
rd
 EP than in the 2
nd
 EP, for both women 
(18.3%<18.5%) and men (35.4%<36.3%), and the overall effect of sex is also greater in the 
3
rd
 EP than in the 2
nd
 EP (b=.92>b=.89).  
Further, in contrast to the finding in the 2
nd
 EP but consistent with the finding the 1
st
 EP, 
sex do not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Economic/Technic group. Hence, as mentioned before, this finding is divergent to other 
researchers´ observations that women parliamentarians are significantly less likely than men 
parliamentarians, to sit on committees dealing with business and private economic concerns 
(Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). Moreover, in line with 
the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there 
are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP Party 
group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an 
effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in the 3
rd
 EP, which is 
consistent with previous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 
2006; Wängnerud 1999; Yordanova 2009).  
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a 
statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood 
than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the 3
rd
 EP. 
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Additional, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 3
rd
 EP. 
We now leave the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turn our attention to the 
results in Model 3 and Model 4.  The results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the 
interaction variables are significant. Hence, as in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 EP, being a women MEP from 
a certain member state, or being a women with a certain partisan affiliation, does not higher or 
lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 3
rd
 EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the 
results in Table 8 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in 
the 4
th
 EP. 
5.2.4 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 4th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 4
th
 EP are displayed in Table 9. The results in 
Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is 
significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law 
group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-1.01), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a women will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 40.9%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
20.2%. Hence, women are more likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group (40.9%>20.2%). Again, the finding is in line with previous 
researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 
1999). An interesting remark is though that the probability of membership in an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group is lower for women (60.2%>40.9%) but higher men 
(19.7%<20.2%) in the 4
th
 EP, than in the 3
rd
 EP, and that the overall effect of sex is also 
smaller in the 4
th
 EP than in the 3
rd
 EP (b=-1.01<b=-1.82). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
(b=.65), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 23.9%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
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37.5%. Hence, women are less likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Basic functions group (23.9%<37.4%). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected 
result. Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions 
group is higher for both women (18.5%<23.9%) and men (36.3%<37.5%) in the 4
th
 EP, than 
in the 3
rd
 EP. Although, the overall effect of sex is lower in the 4
th
 EP than in the 3
rd
 EP 
(b=.65<b=.92). Additionally, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on 
membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1
st
 and the 3
rd
 
EP, and divergent to other researchers´ observations (cf. Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; 
Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an 
EP committee in the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there 
are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party 
group. An interesting observation in the results in Model 2 is though that the main effect of 
Conservatives on membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is 
significant (b=.59). Thus, the result implies that MEPs from the Conservative EP party group 
have a higher likelihood than MEPs from the Others EP party group to be assigned to an EP 
committee in the Economic/Technic group. In the other groups, neither nationality nor EP 
party group has any effect. Hence, it is difficult to draw any interesting remarks of the finding 
and an additional factor which enhances it is that the classification of the control variable EP 
party group induces that the Others EP party group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP 
party groups and the non-attached members in the 4
th
 EP. Thus further analysis of the results 
in the following EPs will expose if this finding is relevant or not. However, since only main 
effect of Conservatives is significant
18
, the results in Model 2 implies that neither nationality 
nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups in 
the 2
nd
 EP, which is consistent with previous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 
1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009). 
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a 
statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood, 
than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the 4
th
 EP. 
                                                 
18
 The only control variable which is significant. 
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Additional, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the 4
th
 EP. 
We now have come a long way in the analysis process of the results in Table 9, but before 
we turn to the 5
th
 EP, the results from Model 3 and Model 4 needs to be analyzed. The results 
in Model 3 and Model 4 show that one interaction variable is significant in Model 3, more 
precisely, the results show that the interaction variable for sex*Belgium on membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group is significant. 
The interaction variable for sex*Belgium on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group is (b=2.78). To be able to see the size of the effect we simply add the main 
effect of gender (b=-.47) with the interaction term (b=2.78) and get the value 2.31
19
, which 
we EXP(2.31) and get the value 10.07, which in percentage term means that men MEPs from 
Belgium are 907.0%
20
 more likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law 
group than women MEPs from Belgium. Hence, women MEPs from Belgium have thus a 
lower likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law, than men MEPs from 
Belgium. Putting it at another way, being a woman from Belgium, compared to being from 
any other member state, lowers the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group in the 4
th
 EP. However, since no other interaction variables or neither the 
main effect of sex are significant, it is hard to draw any interesting remarks of this finding, 
thus further analysis of the results in the following EPs are therefore needed to be able to 
determine if this finding is relevant or not. 
Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. 
Hence, the results implies, as in the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 EP, that being a women from a certain EP 
party group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any 
of the groups in the 4
th
 EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the 
results in Table 9 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in 
the 5
th
 EP. 
5.2.5 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 5th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 5
th
 EP are displayed in Table 10. The results in 
Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is 
                                                 
19
 -.47+2.78 = 2.31 
20
 (10.07-1)*100 = 907.0% 
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significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law 
group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-1.35), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 46.3%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
18.4%. Hence, women are more likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group (46.3%>18.4%). Again, the result is in line with previous 
researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 
1999). An interesting remark is though that the probability of membership in an EP committee 
in the Social welfare, group is higher for women (40.9%<46.3%) but lower men 
(20.2%>18.4%) in the 5
th
 EP, than in the 4
th
 EP . Further, the overall effect of sex is also 
greater in the 5
th
 EP (b=-1.35>b=-1.01). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
(b=.61), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 20.6%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
32.4%. Hence, women are less likely than men MEPs to be assigned to an EP committee in 
the Basic functions group (20.6%<32.4%). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected 
result. Additionally, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions 
group is lower for both women (23.9%>20.6%) and men (37.5%>32.4) in the 5
th
 EP, than in 
the 4
th
 EP, and the overall effect of sex is also lower in the 5
th
 EP than in the 4
th
 EP 
(b=.61<b=.65). 
Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in 
an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1
st
, 3
rd 
and 4
th
 EP, and 
divergent to other researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; 
Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee 
in the Economic/Technic group.  
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there 
are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party 
group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an 
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effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups, which is consistent with 
previous observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 1999; 
Yordanova 2009).  
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a 
statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood 
than men, to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group in the 5
th
 EP. 
Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group, in the 5
th
 EP.  
Turning our attention instead to the results in Model 3 and Model 4, the results in Model 3 
and Model 4 show that the main effect of sex and one of the interaction variables is significant 
in Model 3, more precisely, the results show that the main effect of sex and the interaction 
variable for sex*Portugal on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (-
1.18). To be able to see the size of the effect we simply EXP(-1.18) and get the value 0.31, 
which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from the United Kingdom are 69%
21
 less 
likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from 
the United kingdom. Hence, women MEPs from the United Kingdom have a higher likelihood 
to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs from the 
United Kingdom.  
The interaction variable for sex*Portugal on membership in an EP committee in the Social 
welfare group is (b=-3.45). To be able to see the size of the effect we do the same procedure 
as in the section above. Thus adding the main effect of gender (b=-1.18) with the interaction 
variable (b=-3.45), which gives the value -4.63
22
, which we EXP(-4.63), and get the value 
0.01, which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from Portugal are 99.0%
23
 less likely to 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from 
Portugal. Hence, women MEPs from Portugal have thus a higher likelihood to be assigned to 
an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs Portugal.  
                                                 
21
 (0.31-1)*100 = -69% 
22
 -1.18+-3.45 = -4.63 
23
 (0.01-1)*100 = - 99% 
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Thus, the results implies that being a woman from the United Kingdom or from Portugal, 
compared to being from any other member state, higher the likelihood of being assigned to an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group in the 5
th
 EP. Additionally, the results also show 
that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is greater 
for MEPs from Portugal than for MEPs from the United Kingdom (-4.63>-1.18). The results 
thus furthermore implies that being a woman from Portugal compared to being a women from 
The United Kingdom higher the likelihood even more of being assigned to an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group in the 5
th
 EP.  
However, since no other interaction variables are significant it is hard to draw any 
interesting remarks of this finding. An added difficulty is that comparing this finding with the 
finding in Table 9, that being a woman from Belgium, compared to being from any other 
member state lowers the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law 
group, does not seems to be fruitfully. Thus, further analysis of the results in the following 
EPs are therefore needed to be able to determine if this finding in Table 10 is relevant or not. 
Further, the results in Model 4 show that none of the interaction variables are significant. 
Hence, the results implies, as in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd 
and 4
th
 EP, that being a women from a certain 
EP party group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in 
any of the groups in the 5
th
 EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the 
results in Table 10 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in 
the 6
th
 EP. 
5.2.6 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 6th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the 6
th
 EP are displayed in Table 11. The results in 
Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named group is 
significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the Culture/Law 
group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-.98), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 43.6%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
22.6%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
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Social welfare group (43.6%>22.6%). Again, the result is in line with previous researchers´ 
observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). The 
probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group in is lower for 
women (46.3%>43.6%) but higher for men (18.4%<22.6%) in the 6
th
, than in the 5
th
 EP. The 
overall effect of sex is also smaller in the 6
th
 EP, than in the 5
th
 EP (b=-.98<b=-1.35). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
(b=.63), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 23.2%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic function group is 
36.2%. Hence, women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic 
functions group (23.2%>36.2%). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. 
Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
higher for both women (20.6%<23.2) and men (32.4<36.2) in the 6
th
 EP, than in the 5
th
 EP. 
The overall effect of sex is also higher in the 5
th
 EP than in the 4
th
 EP (b=.63>b=.61). 
Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in 
an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1
st
, 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 EP, and 
divergent to other researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; 
Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee 
in the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in 
the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that there 
are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP party 
group. The results in Model 2 also show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an 
effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups, which is consistent with 
previous researchers´ observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 
1999; Yordanova 2009).  
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a 
statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood, 
than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the 6
th
 EP. 
Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group or in the Economic/Technic group in the 6
th
 EP.  
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We now leave the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turn our attention to the 
results in Model 3 and Model 4. The results in Model 3 and Model 4 show that none of the 
interaction variables are significant. Hence the results implies, as in the 1
st
, 2
nd 
and 3
rd
 EP, that 
being a women MEP from a certain member state does not higher or lower the likelihood to 
be assigned to an EP committee in any of the groups in the 6
th
 EP. Further, the results also 
implies, as in the 1
st
, 2
nd
, 3
rd 
,4
th
 and the 5
th
 EP, that being a women from a certain EP party 
group, does not higher or lower the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of the 
groups in the 6
th
 EP.  
With the results in Model 3 and Model 4 now also analyzed, the analysis process of the 
results in Table 11 is finished, and we therefore turn to the results of the logistic regressions in 
the current 7
th
 EP. 
5.2.7 The probability of membership in an EP committee in a named 
group in the 7th EP 
The results of the logistic regressions in the current 7
th
 EP are displayed in Table 12. The 
results in Model 1 show that the effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in a named 
group is significant in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group. In the 
Culture/Law group and in the Economic/Technic group, the effect of sex is not significant. 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
(b=-.82), which implies a positive effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Social welfare group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 38.0%, whilst the predicted 
probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is 
21.9%. Hence, women are more likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group (38.0%>21.9%). Again, the result is in line with previous researchers´ 
observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999). The 
probability of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is lower for both 
women (43.6%>38.0) and for men (22.6%>21.9%) in the 7
th
, than in the 6
th
 EP. The overall 
effect of sex is also smaller in the 7
th
 EP, than in both the 6
th
 and the 5
th
 EP (b-.82<b=-
.98<b=-1.35). 
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
(b=.54), which implies a negative effect for women on the probability of membership in an 
EP committee in the Basic functions group. Thus, the predicted probability that a woman will 
be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 25.1%, whilst the predicted 
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probability that a man will be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
36.0%. Hence, women are less likely than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic 
functions group (25.1%<36.0%). Again, this finding is divergent from the expected result. 
Further, the probability of membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group is 
lower for women (23.2%>25.1%) but higher men (36.2%<36.0%) in the 7
th
 EP, than in the 6
th
 
EP. The overall effect of sex is though lower in the 7
th
 EP than in the 6
th
 EP (b=-54<b=.63). 
Moreover, in line with the expected result, sex does not have an effect on membership in 
an EP committee in the Culture/Law group. However, as in the 1
st
, 3
rd
, 4
th,
 5
th
 and 6
th
 EP, and 
divergent to other researchers´ observations (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; 
Wängnerud 1999), sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee 
in the Economic/Technic group. 
The results from Model 2 show that the effect on sex on membership in an EP committee 
in the Social welfare group and in the Basic functions group remains significant, and that 
there are no changes in the b coefficients´ directions, when controlling for nationality and EP 
party group. The results in Model 2, also show that neither nationality nor EP party group 
have an effect on membership in an EP committee in any of the groups, which is consistent 
with previous observations (cf. Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Wängnerud 1999; 
Yordanova 2009). 
The main result of the analysis of the results in Model 1 and Model 2 is that: sex is a 
statistical significant determinant of membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare 
group and in the Basic functions group; and that women have a higher likelihood to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men, but a lower likelihood, 
than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in the current 7
th
 
EP. Additionally, sex does not have a significant effect on membership in an EP committee in 
the Culture/Law group or in the Economic Technic group in the current 7
th
 EP.  
Leaving the results in Model 1 and Model 2 and instead turning our attention to the results 
in Model 3 and Model 4. The results in Model 4 show that the main effect of sex and one of 
the interaction variables is significant, more precisely, the results show that the main effect of 
sex and the interaction variable for sex*Liberals on membership in an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group is significant.  
The main effect of sex on membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group is (-
0.88). To be able to see the size of the effect we simply EXP(-0.88) and get the value 0.42, 
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which in percentage term mean that men MEPs from the Others EP party group are 58%
24
 
less likely to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs 
from the Others EP party group. Hence, women from the Others EP party group have a higher 
likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs 
from the Others EP party group.  
The interaction term for sex*Liberals on membership in an EP committee in the Social 
welfare group is (b=1.37). To be able to see the size of the effect we do the same procedure as 
before. Thus adding the main effect of sex (b=-.88) with the interaction variable (b=1.37), 
which gives the value 0.49
25
, which we EXP(0.49), and get the value 1.63, which in 
percentage term mean that men MEPs from the Liberals EP party group are 63%
26
 more likely 
to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than women MEPs from the 
Liberals EP party group. Hence, women MEPs from the Liberals EP party group have a lower 
likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, than men MEPs 
from the Liberals EP party group. Thus, the results implies that being a woman from the 
Others EP Party group, compared to being from another EP Party group, higher the likelihood 
of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, while being a women from 
the Liberals EP party group, compared to being from any another EP Party groups, lower the 
likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group in the current 7
th
 
EP. However, since no other interaction variables are significant it is hard to draw any 
interesting remarks of this finding. An added difficulty is, as mentioned before, that the 
classification of the control variable EP party group induces that the Others EP party group 
consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party groups and the non-attached members in the 
current 7
th
 EP.  
5.2.8 Summary 
The result from the analysis shows that women have a higher likelihood than men to be 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, in all EPs. This finding is well in 
line with other researchers´ observations of committee assignments in national Parliaments 
(Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 1999) and consistent with 
Hypothesis 2a, which implicates that Hypothesis 2a is accepted. However, there are no 
evidence in the data of a pattern that the effect of sex have been decreasing over time, which 
                                                 
24
 (0.42-1)*100 = - 58% 
25
 -.88+1.37 = 0.49 
26
 (1.63-1)*100 = 63% 
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is contrary to the findings of Wängnerud (199) who found that the effect of sex on committee 
assignments to the Social welfare group in the Swedish Parliament decreased over time, and 
that the effect of sex no longer was significant after the 1994 election.  
Further, the result from the analysis also shows, consistent with Hypothesis 2b, that sex 
does not have an effect on assignments to EP committees in the Culture/Law group in any of 
the EPs. The finding thus implicates that Hypothesis 2a is accepted.  
However, contrary to Hypothesis 2c, the result from the analysis show that women have a 
lower likelihood than men to be assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions group, in 
all EPs, except for in the 1
st
 EP. Hence, the finding implies that Hypothesis 2c is rejected. 
Additional, as in the Social welfare group, there is no evidence in the data of a pattern that the 
effect of sex has been decreasing over time.  
The result from the analysis furthermore show, contrary to Hypothesis 2c, that sex only 
had an effect on assignments to EP committees in the Economic group in the 2
nd
 EP. In the 
other EPs, sex did not have an effect. Hence, the finding thus implies that Hypothesis 2c is 
rejected. Further, the finding is also divergent to other researchers´ observations of committee 
assignments in national Parliaments (Skard and Haavio-Mannila 1985; Thomas 1994; 
Wängnerud 1999). A summary of the 2
nd
 set of hypothesis is not displayed in Table 14. 
Additionally, except for minor expectations in the 2
nd
 and 4
th
 EP, the results from the analysis 
show that neither nationality nor EP party group have an effect on membership in an EP 
committee in any of the groups. These findings are thus consistent with previous researchers´ 
observations (Bowler and Farrell 1995; McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009) that the composition 
of the EP committees is largely proportional to the national and partisan composition of the 
plenary. 
Moreover, the results showed that the control variable nationality interacted with sex in the 
4
th
 and 5
th
 EP. In the 4
th
 EP, being a woman from Belgium compared to being from any other 
member state decreased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Culture/Law group. While in the 5
th
 EP, being a woman from the United Kingdom or from 
Portugal, compared to being from any other member state, increased the likelihood of being 
assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group, and that being a woman from 
Portugal compared to being a women from The United Kingdom increased the likelihood 
even more. It is difficulty to draw any interesting remarks of these inductive findings since 
comparing the finding in the 4
th
 EP with the finding in the 5
th
 EP does not seem to give any 
fruitful insights. Further, since no other interaction variables in the different EPs were 
significant the result of the analysis thus implies that being a woman from a certain member 
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state do not increase or decrease the likelihood to be assigned to an EP committee in any of 
the groups.  
In the current 7
th
 EP, the result showed that the control variable EP party group interacted 
with sex. Hence, being a woman from the Others EP Party group, compared to being from 
another EP Party group, increased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the 
Social welfare group, while being a women from the Liberals EP party group, compared to 
being from another EP Party group, decreased the likelihood of being assigned to an EP 
committee in the Social welfare group in the current 7
th
 EP. However, as mentioned before, 
the classification of the control variable EP party group induces that the Others EP party 
group consists of MEPs from the smaller EP party groups and the non-attached members in 
the current 7
th
 EP. Thus, the result may be a product of a methodological choice in the 
classification process of the EP party groups. Further, since no other interaction variables in 
the different EPs were significant, the result of the analysis implies that being a woman from a 
certain EP party group do not increase or decrease the likelihood to be assigned to an EP 
committee in any of the groups. 
Table 14: Summary of the 2
nd
 set of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Decision 
H2a: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Social welfare group is increased by being a 
woman. 
Accepted 
H2b: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Culture/Law group is neither increased nor 
decreased by being a woman. 
Accepted 
H2c: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Basic functions groups is neither decreased 
nor increased by being a woman. 
Rejected 
H2d: The likelihood of being assigned to an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group is decreased by 
being a woman. 
Rejected 
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Table 6: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 1
st
 EP (1979-1984) 
 
Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -.96** 
(.29) 
-.96** 
(.30) 
.02 
(.84) 
-1.10 
(.86) 
.48 
(.34) 
.48 
(.35) 
.30 
(.84) 
20.38 
(14210.04) 
.45 
(.30) 
.42 
(.31) 
-.92 
(.66) 
-.44 
(.82) 
.46 
(.28) 
.45 
(.29) 
1.35 
(.82) 
.99 
(.88) 
Nationality                 
Belgium  .46 
(.56) 
1.91 
(1.20) 
  .23 
(.56) 
-19.70 
(17974.84) 
  -.26 
(.52) 
-21.39 
(17974.84) 
  -.01 
(.49) 
1.91 
(1.20) 
 
Denmark  -1.45 
(1.12) 
.41 
(1.39 
  .10 
(.75) 
-19.70 
(20096.48) 
  .74 
(.62) 
-.18 
(1.17) 
  -.30 
(.64) 
.41 
(1.39) 
 
France  -.11 
(.47) 
-.11 
(1.01) 
  .15 
(.44) 
-.11 
(1.01) 
  -.33 
(.40) 
-1.14 
(.80) 
  -.11 
(.38) 
1.28 
(.91) 
 
Germany  .02 
(.42) 
1.50 
(.97) 
  .00 
(.39) 
-19.70 
(11602.71) 
  -.12 
(.35) 
-1.28 
(.90) 
  .21 
(.33) 
.41 
(1.03) 
 
Greece  -.92 
(.81) 
1.50 
(1.62) 
  .64 
(.53) 
-19.70 
(28420.72) 
  .22 
(.49) 
-21.39 
(28420.73) 
  -.39 
(.50) 
1.50 
(1.62) 
 
Ireland  .49 
(.68) 
22.71 
(40192.98) 
  -19.97 
(10363.61) 
-19.70 
(40192.97) 
  .79 
(.59) 
-21.39 
(40192.98) 
  -.20 
(.59) 
-19.70 
(40192.98) 
 
Italy  -.19 
(.47) 
1.10 
(1.01) 
  .49 
(.41) 
.66 
(1.04) 
  .00 
(.37) 
-21.39 
(12710.14) 
  -.35 
(.37) 
.66 
(1.04) 
 
Luxembourg  .99 
(.98) 
22.71 
(40192.97) 
  -.06 
(1.16) 
-19.70 
(40192.97) 
  -20.61 
(17917.67) 
-21.39 
(40192.97) 
  -.07 
(.95) 
-19.70 
(40192.97) 
 
Netherlands  .67 
(.54) 
1.10 
(1.20) 
  1.00 
(.51) 
2.89* 
(1.36) 
  -.27 
(.52) 
-.59 
(1.10) 
  -.77 
(.54) 
-19.70 
(17974.85) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  .08 
(.57) 
 -.34 
(1.00) 
 -.66 
(.55) 
 19.01 
(14210.04) 
 .45 
(.48) 
 -1.69 
(1.28) 
 -.26 
(.45) 
 1.10 
(1.03) 
Socialists  -.11 
(.47) 
 -.08 
(.83) 
 -.09 
(.44) 
 20.10 
(14210.04) 
 .40 
(.41) 
 -.59 
(.85) 
 -.39 
(.38) 
 .00 
(.93) 
Liberals  .18 
(.56) 
 -.18 
(1.13) 
 -.30 
(.55) 
 19.59 
(14210.04) 
 .40 
(.50) 
 -.18 
(1.13) 
 -.21 
(.47) 
 .41 
(1.19) 
Conservatives  -.20 
(.48) 
 -.10 
(.89) 
 -.01 
(0.44) 
 19.66 
(14210.04) 
 .33 
(.41) 
 -.36 
(.90) 
 -.26 
(.38) 
 .22 
(.97) 
Interaction  
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Belgium   -1.75 
(1.37) 
   20.13 
(17974.84) 
   21.59 
(17974.84) 
   -2.29 
(1.32) 
 
Sex*Denmark   -20.12 
(12710.13) 
   20.06 
(20096.48) 
   .92 
(1.36) 
   -.66 
(1.56) 
 
Sex*France   .35 
(1.10) 
   .07 
(1.09) 
   .91 
(.89) 
   -1.62 
(.99) 
 
Sex*Germany   -1.86 
(1.08) 
   19.84 
(11602.71) 
   1.39 
(.97) 
   -.25 
(1.09) 
 
Sex*Greece   -3.06 
(1.94) 
   20.34 
(28420.72) 
   21.94 
(28420.73) 
   -2.11 
(1.70) 
 
Sex*Ireland   -22.52 
(40192.98) 
   -.30 
(41603.68) 
   22.41 
(40192.98) 
   19.57 
(40192.98) 
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Sex*Italy -1.44 
(1.12) 
-.41 
(1.12) 
21.78 
(12710.14) 
-1.10 
(1.10) 
Sex*Luxembourg 
 
  -22.32 
(40192.97) 
   19.80 
(40192.97) 
   .92 
(44937.11) 
   19.85 
(40192.97) 
 
Sex*Netherlands   -.39 
(1.34) 
   -2.46 
(1.48) 
   .30 
(1.24) 
   19.08 
(17974.85) 
 
Interaction  
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    .37 
(1.19) 
   -19.57 
(14210.04) 
   2.35 
(1.38) 
   -1.77 
(1.14) 
Sex*Socialists    .04 
(.98) 
   -20.45 
(14210.04) 
   1.04 
(.95) 
   -.30 
(1.01) 
Sex*Liberals    .60 
(1.29) 
   -19.96 
(14210.04) 
   .44 
(1.25) 
   -.70 
(1.29) 
Sex*Conservatives    .06 
(1.02) 
   -19.83 
(14210.04) 
   .71 
(.99) 
   -.41 
(1.04) 
Constant -.63* 
(0.25) 
-.53 
(.57) 
-1.50* 
(0.78) 
-0.51 
(0.73) 
-1.56*** 
(.32) 
-1.64 
(.58) 
-1.50 
(.78) 
-21.20 
(14210.04) 
-1.04*** 
(.27) 
-1.30* 
(.52) 
.18 
(.61) 
-.51 
(.73) 
-.83** 
(.26) 
-.43 
(.49) 
-1.50 
(.78) 
-1.10 
(.82) 
Observations 411 411 411 411 4114 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 411 
-2LL 400.54 390.86 376.68 399.49 451.66 434.75 420.79 445.66 524.84 513.35 496.10 520.42 547.61 541.34 531.92 543.24 
Nagelkerke R
2 
0.04 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 
Percentage Classified 80.0% 80.0% 80.8% 80.0% 75.9% 75.9% 76.6% 75.9% 65.9% 66.4% 66.7% 65.9% 60.8% 61.3% 61.1% 60.8% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP 
party group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official 
EP website.  
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Table 7: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 2nd EP (1984-1989) 
 Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -1.77*** 
(0.26) 
-1.83*** 
(.27) 
-1.37* 
(.66) 
-1.68* 
(.69) 
.11 
(.30) 
.03 
(.31) 
1.03 
(1.09) 
-.14 
(.73) 
.89** 
(.30) 
.91** 
(.31) 
.31 
(.72) 
1.74 
(1.08) 
.68* 
(.29) 
.77* 
(.30) 
.59 
(.71) 
1.41 
(1.08) 
Nationality                 
Belgium  .15 
(.57) 
.41 
(1.08) 
  .76 
(.54) 
1.01 
(1.53) 
  .20 
(.52) 
-.29 
(1.30) 
  -.22 
(.53) 
.69 
(1.13) 
 
Denmark  -.60 
(.72) 
-.92 
(1.02) 
  -.39 
(.83) 
1.48 
(1.34) 
  .39 
(.63) 
-.69 
(1.27) 
  .23 
(.63) 
.81 
(1.01) 
 
France  .28 
(.42) 
.69 
(.80) 
  .24 
(.44) 
.53 
(1.29) 
  -.15 
(.40) 
-.29 
(.93) 
  -.03 
(.38) 
-.29 
(.93) 
 
Germany  -.07 
(.40) 
.69 
(.80) 
  .11 
(.41) 
1.01 
(1.23) 
  -.09 
(.36) 
-.29 
(.93) 
  .26 
(.34) 
-.29 
(.93) 
 
Greece  -.65 
(.71) 
21.20 
(28420.72) 
  .95 
(.54) 
-18.80 
(28420.73) 
  1.14* 
(.51) 
-20.10 
(28420.73) 
  -.90 
(.61) 
-20.10 
(28420.72) 
 
Ireland  .40 
(.67) 
.00 
(1.53) 
  -.48 
(.84) 
2.40 
(1.76) 
  .12 
(.63) 
-20.10 
(28420.72) 
  -.27 
(.65) 
-20.10 
(28420.72) 
 
Italy  .05 
(.43) 
.51 
(.93) 
  .51 
(.42) 
1.89 
(1.27) 
  .00 
(.38) 
-.85 
(1.26) 
  -.24 
(.38) 
-.85 
(1.26) 
 
Luxembourg  -.22 
(1.28) 
21.20 
(40192.97) 
  1.51 
(1.04) 
-18.80 
(40192.97) 
  -.20 
(1.19) 
-20.10 
(40192.97) 
  .67 
(1.04) 
22.30 
(40192.97) 
 
Netherland  .10 
(.56) 
.29 
(.96) 
  -.24 
(.63) 
.61 
(1.50) 
  .48 
(.49) 
.18 
(1.07) 
  -.32 
(.52) 
-.69 
(1.27) 
 
Portugal  .77 
(.57) 
.00 
(1.53) 
  -.09 
(.65) 
-18.80 
(28420.72) 
  -.11 
(.55) 
1.10 
(1.56) 
  -.18 
(.53) 
-20.10 
(28420.72) 
 
Spain  -.28 
(.45) 
.00 
(1.00) 
  .21 
(.44) 
2.40 
(1.33) 
  .27 
(.38) 
-20.10 
(16408.71) 
  -.31 
(.38) 
-20.10 
(16408.71) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  -.31 
(.48) 
 -.34 
(.92) 
 -.49 
(.49) 
 -.27 
(1.05) 
 .17 
(.43) 
 .22 
(1.49) 
 .05 
(.46) 
 1.61 
(1.26) 
Socialists  -.26 
(.35) 
 -.32 
(.72) 
 -.17 
(.35) 
 -.37 
(.80) 
 -.03 
(.32) 
 .95 
1.13 
 .37 
(.33) 
 .76 
(1.14) 
Liberals  -.58 
(.50) 
 -.56 
(1.18) 
 -.19 
(.48) 
 -20.22 
(20096.48) 
 -.09 
(.44) 
 2.30 
(1.45) 
 .47 
(.43) 
 1.20 
(1.56) 
Conservatives  -.23 
(.35) 
 -.05 
(.76) 
 -.21 
(.35) 
 -.35 
(.84) 
 -.01 
(.32) 
 .69 
(1.18) 
 .35 
(.33) 
 1.20 
(1.15) 
Interaction  
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Belgium   -.36 
(1.26) 
   -.18 
(1.63) 
   .54 
(1.41) 
   -1.21 
(1.27) 
 
 
Sex*Denmark   1.18 
(1.34) 
   -21.32 
(14210.36) 
   1.48 
(1.48) 
   -1.40 
(1.33) 
 
Sex*France   -.49 
(.91) 
   -.24 
(1.36) 
   .17 
(1.01) 
   .13 
(1.00) 
 
Sex*Germany   -1.01 
(.92) 
   -1.01 
(1.30) 
   .21 
(1.00) 
   .61 
(1.00) 
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Sex*Greece -22.78 
(28420.72) 
19.77 
(28420.73) 
21.51 
(28420.73) 
19.23 
(28420.72) 
Sex*Ireland   .56 
(1.67) 
   -3.52 
(2.07) 
   20.42 
(28420.72) 
   19.80 
(28420.72) 
 
Sex*Italy   -.60 
(1.03) 
   -1.64 
(1.34) 
   1.01 
(1.31) 
   .53 
(1.31) 
 
Sex*Luxembourg   -41.04 
(46410.84) 
   20.87 
(40192.97) 
   20.20 
(40192.97) 
   -22.48 
(40192.97) 
 
Sex*Netherland   -.24 
(1.15) 
   -.91 
(1.66) 
   .29 
(1.20) 
   .43 
(1.39) 
 
Sex*Portugal   .60 
(1.62) 
   18.67 
(28420.72) 
   -1.29 
(1.66) 
   20.06 
(28420.72) 
 
Sex*Spain   -.36 
(1.12) 
   -2.49 
(1.41) 
   20.55 
(16408.71) 
   19.86 
(16408.71) 
 
Interaction  
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    .03 
(1.05) 
   -.03 
(1.16) 
   .01 
(1.55) 
   -1.97 
(1.35) 
Sex*Socialists    -.03 
(.80) 
   .27 
(.87) 
   -1.01 
(1.17) 
   -.38 
(1.19) 
Sex*Liberals    .19 
(1.28) 
   20.17 
(20096.48) 
   -2.64 
(1.51) 
   -.85 
(1.62) 
Sex*Conservatives    -.37 
(.83) 
   .19 
(.87) 
   -.73 
(1.22) 
   -.88 
(1.19) 
Constant .34 
(22) 
.59 
(.48) 
.00 
(.58) 
.56 
(.63) 
-1.34*** 
(.27) 
-1.33 
(.51) 
-2.40* 
(1.04) 
-.98 
(.68) 
-1.50*** 
(.29) 
-1.60** 
(.48) 
-1.10 
(.67) 
-2.30* 
(1.05) 
-1.34*** 
(.27) 
-1.60** 
(.48) 
-1.10 
(.67) 
-2.30* 
(1.05) 
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 
-2LL 517.29 509.23 500.05 515.29 524.28 513.76 499.20 521.69 614.60 604.84 595.53 609.94 613.96 603.74 594.61 607.39 
Nagelkerke R
2 
.14 .16 .18 .14 .00 .03 .08 .01 .03 .05 .08 .04 .02 .05 .07 .04 
Percentage Classified 77.0% 72.2% 77.6% 77.0% 77.8% 78.0% 78.0% 77.8% 67.5% 68.7% 68.7% 67.5% 68.1% 67.9% 68.3% 68.1% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party 
group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.  
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Table 8: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 3
rd
 EP (1989-1994) 
 
Social Welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -1.82*** 
(.23) 
-1.84*** 
(.25) 
-2.50** 
(.74) 
-1.49** 
(.51) 
.11 
(.24) 
-.03 
(.25) 
-.21 
(.67) 
.47 
(.57) 
.92** 
(.27) 
.84** 
(.28) 
1.84 
(1.08) 
1.10 
(.60) 
.48 
(.26) 
.58 
(.27) 
1.70 
(1.08) 
.28 
(.57) 
Nationality                 
Belgium  .11 
(.54) 
-1.39 
(1.01) 
  .76 
(.48) 
.41 
(.98) 
  -.59 
(.57) 
.61 
(1.50) 
  .18 
(.51) 
2.11 
(1.29) 
 
Denmark  .02 
(.66) 
.51 
(1.28) 
  -20.37 
(10375.46) 
-20.51 
(16408.71) 
  -.55 
(.72) 
.79 
(1.51) 
  .93 
(.60) 
.79 
(1.51) 
 
France  -.54 
(.42) 
-1.22 
(.82) 
  .03 
(.37) 
-.18 
(.81) 
  -.15 
(.38) 
1.52 
(1.17) 
  .12 
(.38) 
.86 
(1.22) 
 
Germany  -.22 
(.39) 
-.81 
(.77) 
  -.17 
(.36) 
-.05 
(.73) 
  -.08 
(.36) 
.61 
(1.18) 
  .22 
(.36) 
1.10 
(1.14) 
 
Greece  .12 
(.55) 
.31 
(.56) 
  .71 
(.49) 
.74 
(.49) 
  .13 
(.50) 
.05 
(.49) 
  -.29 
(.54) 
-.41 
(.54) 
 
Ireland  -.53 
(.75) 
-22.30 
(28420.72) 
  .13 
(.62) 
.69 
(1.54) 
  .78 
(.60) 
-18.80 
(28420.72) 
  -.48 
(.71) 
2.40 
(1.76) 
 
Italy  -.13 
(.40) 
-1.10 
(.88) 
  .14 
(.36) 
.00 
(.87) 
  .08 
(.36) 
1.30 
(1.24) 
  -.09 
(.37) 
1.30 
(1.24) 
 
Luxembourg  1.20 
(.99) 
20.10 
(23205.42) 
  -.79 
(1.13) 
-20.51 
(23205.42) 
  -.60 
(1.14) 
-18.80 
(23205.42) 
  -.60 
(1.13) 
1.70 
(1.61) 
 
Netherland  .11 
(.53) 
-.18 
(1.07) 
  -.32 
(.54) 
-.22 
(1.04) 
  .26 
(.50) 
.61 
(1.50) 
  -.25 
(.54) 
1.48 
(1.34) 
 
Portugal  -.11 
(.59) 
20.10 
(23205.42) 
  -.03 
(.54) 
.00 
(1.37) 
  .78 
(.51) 
-18.80 
(23205.42) 
  -.82 
(.63) 
-18.80 
(23205.42) 
 
Spain  -.36 
(.43) 
-.54 
(.92) 
  .11 
(.38) 
-.81 
(.99) 
  .16 
(.37) 
1.84 
(1.22) 
  -.09 
(.39) 
.89 
(1.30) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  .12 
(.71) 
 -.88 
(1.30) 
 -.17 
(.67) 
 .53 
(1.33) 
 -.37 
(.69) 
 .81 
(1.34) 
 .05 
(.73) 
 .53 
(1.33) 
Socialists  -.21 
(.32) 
 .22 
(.53) 
 -.09 
(.29) 
 .32 
(.61) 
 -.21 
(.29) 
 -.37 
(.71) 
 
 
.14 
(.30) 
 -.16 
(.63) 
Liberals  -.23 
(.46) 
 1.20 
(.90) 
 .06 
(.41) 
 .38 
(.86) 
 -.23 
(.41) 
 -.69 
(1.19) 
 .39 
(.41) 
 -.16 
(.94) 
Conservatives  -.05 
(.33) 
 .25 
(.58) 
 .04 
(.30) 
 .48 
(.65) 
 -.16 
(.30) 
 .59 
(.69) 
 .22 
(.31) 
 -.08 
(.69) 
Interaction  
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Belgium   2.10 
(1.17) 
   .50 
(1.12) 
   -1.30 
(1.63) 
   -2.37 
(1.42) 
 
Sex*Denmark   -1.18 
(1.69) 
   .21 
(21183.56) 
   -1.48 
(1.73) 
   .60 
(1.69) 
 
Sex*France   .97 
(.95) 
   .27 
(.90) 
   -1.86 
(1.23) 
   -.83 
(1.28) 
 
Sex*Germany   .81 
(.90) 
   -.22 
(.85) 
   -.65 
(1.24) 
   -.93 
(1.21) 
 
Sex*Greece                 
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Sex*Ireland 
 
  22.50 
(28420.72) 
 
 
  -.60 
(1.68) 
   19.83 
(28420.72) 
   -3.41 
(1.94) 
 
Sex*Italy   1.26 
(.99) 
   .19 
(.95) 
   -1.31 
(1.29) 
   -1.57 
(1.30) 
 
Sex*Luxembourg   -19.39 
(23205.42) 
   20.72 
(23205.42) 
   18.67 
(23205.42) 
   -22.21 
(23205.42) 
 
Sex*Netherland   .33 
(1.25) 
   -.12 
(1.21) 
   -.27 
(1.60) 
   -2.04 
(1.48) 
 
Sex*Portugal   -20.49 
(23205.42) 
   -.01 
(1.48) 
   19.65 
(23205.42) 
   18.05 
(23205.42) 
 
Sex*Spain   .18 
(1.05) 
   1.12 
(1.07) 
   -1.88 
(1.28) 
   -1.09 
(1.37) 
 
Interaction  
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    1.33 
(1.50) 
   -.62 
(1.52) 
   -1.25 
(1.53) 
   -.97 
(.1.57) 
Sex*Socialists    -.43 
(.63) 
 
 
  -.44 
(.68) 
   .21 
(.76) 
   .27 
(.70) 
Sex*Liberals    -1.95 
(1.08) 
   -.40 
(.96) 
   .69 
(1.26) 
   .46 
(1.04) 
Sex*Conservatives    -.21 
(.68) 
   -.48 
(.72) 
   -.86 
(.76) 
   .26 
(.76) 
Constant .41* 
(.20) 
.70 
(.44) 
1.10 
(.67) 
.18 
(.43) 
-.91*** 
(.21) 
-.81 
(.42) 
-.69 
(.61) 
-1.22* 
(.51) 
-1.48*** 
(.25) 
-1.30** 
(.43) 
-2.40* 
(1.04) 
-1.50** 
(.55) 
-1.31*** 
(.24) 
-1.54*** 
(.44) 
.2.40* 
(1.04) 
-1.22* 
(.51) 
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 
-2LL 533.17 526.60 512.35 527.07 613.29 594.24 590.45 612.44 615.88 606.15 595.95 611.20 592.40 583.59 573.11 590.94 
Nagelkerke R
2 
.17 .19 .22 .19 .00 .05 .06 .00 .04 .06 .09 .05 .01 .04 .06 .01 
Percentage Classified 76.0% 76.0% 76.8 76.2% 69.5% 69.7% 69.5% 69.5% 67.5% 68.9% 68.7% 67.5 71.5% 71.5% 72.1% 71.5% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party 
group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient reported for Sex*Greece since no women MEPs in the 3
rd
 EP were from 
Greece. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.  
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Table 9: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 4
th
 EP (1994-1999) 
 
Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -1.01*** 
(.20) 
-1.03*** 
(.21) 
-.85 
(.58) 
-.33 
(.45) 
-.25 
(.20) 
-.33 
(.21) 
-.47 
(.61) 
-.25 
(.01) 
.65** 
(.21) 
.61** 
(.22) 
.36 
(.63) 
.14 
(.42) 
.10 
(.21) 
.15 
(.22) 
-.23 
(.61) 
.56 
(.54) 
Nationality                 
Austria  -.38 
(.59) 
-.04 
(.92) 
  .79 
(.52) 
.50 
(.94) 
  -.41 
(.58) 
.81 
(.96) 
  -.12 
(.58) 
-20.41 
(15191.52) 
 
Belgium  -.07 
(.54) 
-.26 
(.89) 
  .78 
(.50) 
-1.16 
(1.20) 
  -.14 
(.52) 
.00 
(1.00) 
  .04 
(.52) 
.28 
(.91) 
 
Denmark  .22 
(.65) 
.94 
(1.00) 
  -.95 
(.84) 
-20.41 
(16408.71) 
  -.02 
(.66) 
-20.10 
(16408.71) 
  .09 
(.66) 
.10 
(1.02) 
 
Finland  -.97 
(.83) 
-1.13 
(1.23) 
  -.90 
(.83) 
.38 
(1.06) 
  .63 
(.61) 
.69 
(1.08) 
  .67 
(.61) 
.38 
(1.06) 
 
France  -.38 
(.39) 
-.90 
(.69) 
  .12 
(.38) 
.38 
(.68) 
  -.06 
(.37) 
.15 
(.73) 
  .32 
(.38) 
-.87 
(-77) 
 
Germany  -.57 
(.37) 
-.30 
(.63) 
  -.08 
(.36) 
-.22 
(.68) 
  -.04 
(.33) 
-.29 
(.74) 
  .23 
(.34) 
.10 
(.66) 
 
Greece  -.25 
(.54) 
-.15 
(1.04) 
  .20 
(.52) 
.38 
(1.06) 
  .89 
(.48) 
1.50 
(1.08) 
  -.17 
(.54) 
-20.41 
(17974.84) 
 
Ireland  .53 
(.62) 
1.35 
(1.26) 
  .01 
(.66) 
.79 
(1.14) 
  .52 
(.60) 
.00 
(1.29) 
  .13 
(.66) 
-.31 
(1.27) 
 
Italy  -.11 
(.37) 
-.09 
(.77) 
  .63 
(.36) 
.79 
(.79) 
  .16 
(.34) 
.00 
(.88) 
  -.49 
(.38) 
-1.61 
(1.18) 
 
Luxembourg  -.81 
(1.15) 
.25 
(1.50) 
  1.75 
(.91) 
.79 
(1.51) 
  -.79 
(1.13) 
-20.10 
(28420.72) 
  .98 
(.86) 
.79 
(1.51) 
 
Netherlands  .28 
(.49) 
.94 
(.87) 
  -.17 
(.53) 
-.46 
(.97) 
  .34 
(.47) 
-.98 
(1.21) 
  -.19 
(.52) 
.10 
(.89) 
 
Portugal  -.15 
(.55) 
.25 
(1.12) 
  .06 
(.54) 
.79 
(1.14) 
  .26 
(.49) 
-20.10 
(20096.48) 
  .11 
(.52) 
-.31 
(1.27) 
 
Spain  -.37 
(.41) 
-.26 
(.72) 
  .17 
(.40) 
.00 
(.76) 
  .34 
(.37) 
.00 
(.82) 
  -.07 
(.39) 
.28 
(.75) 
 
Sweden  .33 
(.53) 
.25 
(.81) 
  -.55 
(.62) 
-.60 
(.96) 
  -.06 
(.55) 
-.29 
(.98) 
  -.17 
(.58) 
-.60 
(.96) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  .12 
(.47) 
 .61 
(.77) 
 .12 
(.44) 
 .34 
(.76) 
 -.45 
(.44) 
 -1.52 
(1.12) 
 .08 
(.50) 
 -.36 
(1.17) 
Socialists  .09 
(.29) 
 .77 
(.45) 
 -.20 
(.27) 
 -.27 
(.45) 
 -.37 
(.26) 
 -.75 
(.47) 
 .36 
(.29) 
 .82 
(.56) 
Liberals  -.30 
(.48) 
 .27 
(.73) 
 .33 
(.44) 
 -.42 
(.77) 
 -.40 
(.43) 
 -1.74 
(1.11) 
 .54 
(.45) 
 1.54* 
(.78) 
Conservatives  -.04 
(.29) 
 .32 
(.50) 
 -.31 
(.27) 
 -.29 
(.50) 
 -.30 
(.26) 
 -.54 
(.51) 
 .59* 
(.29) 
 .75 
(.60) 
Interaction 
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Austria   -.66 
(1.22) 
   .47 
(1.12) 
   -1.87 
(1.25) 
   20.85 
(15191.52) 
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Sex*Belgium .18 
(1.09) 
2.78* 
(1.33) 
-.14 
(1.16) 
-.43 
(1.11) 
Sex*Denmark   -1.79 
(1.49) 
   20.58 
(16408.71) 
   20.84 
(16408.71) 
   -.17 
(1.34) 
 
Sex*Finland   .15 
(1.65) 
   -20.32 
(13397.66) 
   -.18 
(1.30) 
   .42 
(1.28) 
 
Sex*France   .79 
(.80) 
   -.24 
(.79) 
   -.06 
(.82) 
   1.25 
(.86) 
 
Sex*Germany   -.49 
(.78) 
   .14 
(.80) 
   .35 
(.82) 
   .19 
(.76) 
 
Sex*Greece   -.13 
(1.22 
   -.22 
(1.22) 
   -.77 
(1.20) 
   20.59 
(17974.84) 
 
Sex*Ireland   -1.23 
(1.46) 
   -1.03 
(1.41) 
   .92 
(1.45) 
   .35 
(1.47) 
 
Sex*Italy   -.10 
(.87) 
   -.14 
(.88) 
   .30 
(.95) 
   1.26 
(1.24) 
 
Sex*Luxembourg   -20.36 
(20096.49) 
   1.57 
(1.93) 
   19.74 
(28420.72) 
   .23 
(1.83) 
 
Sex*Netherland   -1.23 
(1.07) 
   .63 
(1.13) 
   1.72 
(1.31) 
   -.46 
(1.09) 
 
Sex*Portugal   -.54 
(1.28) 
   -.91 
(1.30) 
   20.64 
(20096.48) 
   .48 
(1.39) 
 
Sex*Spain   -.17 
(.87) 
   .25 
(.88) 
   .42 
(.91) 
   -.51 
(.87) 
 
Sex*Sweden   .15 
(1.05) 
   .25 
(1.27) 
   .33 
(1.18) 
   .52 
(1.20) 
 
Interaction  
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    -.78 
(.95) 
   -.41 
(.91) 
   1.61 
(1.21) 
   .42 
(1.28) 
Sex*Socialists    -1.05 
(.55) 
   -.04 
(.53) 
   .57 
(.54) 
   -.67 
(.63) 
Sex*Liberals    -.59 
(.91) 
   .71 
(.89) 
   1.79 
(1.19) 
   -1.42 
(.92) 
Sex*Conservatives    -.60 
(.59) 
   -.03 
(.58) 
   .42 
(.58) 
   -.33 
(.67) 
Constant -.37* 
(.16) 
-.17 
(.39) 
-.25 
(.50) 
-.83* 
(.38) 
-.75*** 
(.17) 
-.72 
(.39) 
-.79 
(.54) 
-.56 
(.36) 
-1.16*** 
(.19) 
-.98* 
(.38) 
-1.10 
(.58) 
-.56 
(.36) 
-1.06*** 
(.18) 
-1.48*** 
(.41) 
-.79 
(.54) 
-1.72*** 
(.49) 
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 610 
-2LL 668.67 657.87 649.33 664.14 724.09 700.76 686.28 719.86 771.48 759.84 746.98 765.25 713.93 699.93 690.31 705.65 
Nagelkerke R
2 
.06 .08 .10 .07 .00 .06 .09 .01 .02 .05 .08 .04 .00 .03 .06 .02 
Percentage Classified 74.4% 75.6% 75.6% 74.4% 71.8% 72.1% 72.6% 71.8% 66.1% 66.2% 66.4% 66.1% 72.8% 72.6% 72.8% 72.8% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party 
group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.  
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Table 10: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 5
th
 EP (1999-2004) 
 Social Welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -1.35*** 
(.17) 
-1.46*** 
(.19) 
-1.18* 
(.53) 
-.78 
(.44) 
-.05 
(.18) 
-.08 
(.19) 
.22 
(.58) 
-.53 
(.42) 
.61** 
(.19) 
.65** 
(.20) 
.35 
(.63) 
.26 
(.44) 
.23 
(.19) 
.28 
(.20) 
-.25 
(.54) 
.61 
(.54) 
Nationality                 
Austria  -.52 
(.60) 
-.42 
(.85) 
  .71 
(.51) 
.65 
(.89) 
  -.22 
(.62) 
.35 
(.99) 
  -.20 
(.57) 
-1.25 
(1.16) 
 
Belgium  -.16 
(.55) 
.32 
(.80) 
  .27 
(.50) 
.47 
(.87) 
  .08 
(.55) 
.19 
(.98) 
  -.38 
(.56) 
-1.39 
(1.16) 
 
Cyprus  .32 
(.96) 
21.30 
(40192.97) 
  -.57 
(1.13) 
-20.04 
(40192.97) 
  1.16 
(.87) 
-19.76 
(40192.97) 
  -20.40 
(16397.71) 
-20.51 
(40192.97) 
 
Czech Republic  -.24 
(.59) 
.79 
(1.30) 
  -.24 
(.57) 
.47 
(1.33) 
  .34 
(.53) 
-19.76 
(23205.42) 
  -.22 
(.54) 
-20.51 
(23205.42) 
 
Denmark  .29 
(.62) 
.79 
(.97) 
  -.50 
(.70) 
-.45 
(1.21) 
  -.80 
(.81) 
-19.76 
(16408.71) 
  .39 
(.58) 
.00 
(.98) 
 
Estonia  -.48 
(1.15) 
-21.11 
(40192.97) 
  -.64 
(1.13) 
22.37 
(40192.97) 
  .36 
(.91) 
-19.76 
(40192.97) 
  .16 
(.90) 
-20.51 
(40192.98) 
 
Finland  -.47 
(.66) 
.38 
(.88) 
  -.51 
(.69) 
.88 
(.92) 
  .73 
(.59) 
-19.76 
(15191.52) 
  .12 
(.60) 
-.22 
(.96) 
 
France  -.60 
(.38) 
-.40 
(.55) 
  .25 
(.35) 
.43 
(.62) 
  .34 
(.37) 
.16 
(.68) 
  -.35 
(.37) 
-.76 
(.62) 
 
Germany  -.62 
(.37) 
-.76 
(.57) 
  -.12 
(.34) 
.43 
(.62) 
  .45 
(.35) 
-.01 
(.70) 
  -.07 
(.33) 
-.17 
(.59) 
 
Greece  -.53 
(.59) 
.50 
(1.01) 
  -.10 
(.54) 
-20.04 
(17974.84) 
  .83 
(.50) 
.06 
(1.25) 
  -.33 
(.54) 
-.69 
(1.21) 
 
Hungary  .45 
(.52) 
.79 
(1.30) 
  .31 
(.50) 
-20.04 
(23205.42) 
  -.20 
(.57) 
2.14 
(1.34) 
  -.78 
(.60) 
-20.51 
(23205.43) 
 
Ireland  -.18 
(.68) 
-.31 
(1.01) 
  .41 
(.62) 
-.22 
(1.23) 
  .89 
(.62) 
1.04 
(1.07) 
  -.31 
(.71) 
-.69 
(1.21) 
 
Italy  -.08 
(.37) 
-.31 
(.78) 
  .48 
(.33) 
.76 
(.82) 
  .10 
(.36) 
1.45 
(.84) 
  -.42 
(.36) 
-1.50 
(1.15) 
 
Latvia  -1.24 
(1.15) 
-.60 
(1.30) 
  .09 
(.88) 
.47 
(1.33) 
  1.03 
(.82) 
.75 
(1.34) 
  -.86 
(1.11) 
-20.51 
(23205.42) 
 
Lithuania  -.39 
(.83) 
-21.11 
(40192.97) 
  -.64 
(.82) 
-20.04 
(40192.97) 
  .72 
(.65) 
-19.76 
(40192.96) 
  -.30 
(.71) 
21.90 
(40192.97) 
 
Luxembourg  .15 
(.94) 
21.30 
(28420.72) 
  -20.23 
(16399.36) 
-20.04 
(28420.72) 
  .53 
(.91) 
-19.76 
(28420.72) 
  1.61 
(.90) 
21.90 
(28420.72) 
 
Malta  .22 
(1.19) 
.17 
(1.19) 
  -.07 
(1.18) 
-.16 
(1.19) 
  .01 
(1.19) 
.00 
(1.19) 
  -.30 
(1.18) 
-.16 
(1.19) 
 
Netherland  .64 
(.46) 
1.35 
(.91) 
  -.08 
(.48) 
.94 
(.84) 
  .40 
(.47) 
-19.76 
(13397.66) 
  -.34 
(.50) 
-.56 
(.93) 
 
Poland  -.37 
(.44) 
-.60 
(.83) 
  -.02 
(.40) 
.47 
(.87) 
  .02 
(.42) 
.19 
(.98) 
  .14 
(.38) 
-1.39 
(1.16) 
 
Portugal  -.15 
(.54) 
1.89 
(1.17) 
  .07 
(.51) 
-.63 
(1.20) 
  .69 
(.50) 
-19.76 
(15191.51) 
  -.78 
(.60) 
-1.10 
(1.18) 
 
Slovakia  .06 
(.67) 
21.30 
(23205.42) 
  .10 
(.64) 
-20.04 
(23205.42) 
  -.17 
(.71) 
-19.76 
(23205.42) 
  -.42 
(.70) 
-20.51 
(23205.42) 
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Slovenia 
 
.30 
(.90) 
-21.11 
(40192.97) 
-.84 
(1.11) 
-20.04 
(40192.97) 
.78 
(.82) 
22.65 
(40192.97) 
-.98 
(1.11) 
-20.51 
(40192.97) 
Spain  -.56 
(.41) 
-.19 
(.62) 
  -.07 
(.38) 
.00 
(.72) 
  .72 
(.37) 
.53 
(.74) 
  -.18 
(.38) 
-.47 
(.69) 
 
Sweden  .97 
(.52) 
.32 
(.80) 
  -2.06 
(1.05) 
-.92 
(1.18) 
  .04 
(.58) 
.19 
(.98) 
  -.08 
(.54) 
-.56 
(.93) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  .29 
(.39) 
 1.17 
(.62) 
 -.16 
(.39) 
 -.44 
(.64) 
 -.25 
(.38) 
 -1.03 
(.85) 
 .27 
(.39) 
 (.18) 
.80 
Socialists  .08 
(.28) 
 .61 
(.42) 
 .03 
(.26) 
 -.84 
(.45) 
 -.28 
(.26) 
 -.52 
(.48) 
 .17 
(.28) 
 (.52) 
.55 
Liberals  -.31 
(.40) 
 .66 
(.58) 
 .13 
(.38) 
 .11 
(.59) 
 .07 
(.37) 
 -.34 
(.69) 
 .24 
(.38) 
 (.69) 
.71 
Conservatives  -.04 
(.27) 
 .10 
(.44) 
 -.04 
(.25) 
 -.65 
(.45) 
 -.18 
(.25) 
 -.26 
(.49) 
 .18 
(.27) 
 .(56) 
.56 
Interaction 
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Austria   -.02 
(1.19) 
   .13 
(1.09) 
   -.95 
(1.28) 
   1.38 
(1.34) 
 
Sex*Belgium   -.92 
(1.14) 
   -.22 
(1.07) 
   -.11 
(1.17) 
   1.31 
(1.33) 
 
Sex*Cyprus   -21.41 
(40192.97) 
   19.59 
(40192.97) 
   21.26 
(40192.97) 
   .25 
(44029.19) 
 
Sex*Czech Republic   -1.25 
(1.47) 
   -.92 
(1.47) 
   20.24 
(23205.42) 
   20.60 
(23205.42) 
 
Sex*Denmark   -.90 
(1.29) 
   .00 
(1.47) 
   19.47 
(16408.71) 
   .53 
(1.21) 
 
Sex*Estonia   20.99 
(40192.97) 
   -42.63 
(44029.19) 
   20.45 
(40192.97) 
   21.04 
(40192.98) 
 
Sex*Finland   -20.31 
(13397.66) 
   -21.14 
(13397.66) 
   21.55 
(15191.52) 
   .47 
(1.22) 
 
Sex*France   -.09 
(.75) 
   -.28 
(.75) 
   .25 
(.80) 
   .49 
(.77) 
 
Sex*Germany   .52 
(.72) 
   -.90 
(.75) 
   .53 
(.80) 
   .07 
(.71) 
 
Sex*Greece   -1.43 
(1.29) 
   20.13 
(17974.84) 
   .84 
(1.36) 
   .53 
(1.34) 
 
Sex*Hungary   -.43 
(1.42) 
   20.49 
(23205.42) 
   -2.83 
(1.51) 
   20.00 
(23205.43) 
 
Sex*Ireland   .33 
(1.33) 
   .94 
(1.43) 
   -.17 
(1.29) 
   .38 
(1.48) 
 
Sex*Italy   .24 
(.88) 
   -.38 
(.90) 
   -1.46 
(.93) 
   1.26 
(1.21) 
 
Sex*Latvia   -19.33 
(20096.49) 
   -.63 
(1.78) 
   .34 
(1.70) 
   20.35 
(23205.42) 
 
Sex*Lithuania   20.88 
(40192.97) 
   19.47 
(40192.97) 
   20.67 
(40192.96) 
   -22.46 
(40192.97) 
 
Sex*Luxembourg   -41.23 
(34808.13) 
   -.22 
(34808.13) 
   20.85 
(28420.72) 
   -20.96 
(28420.72) 
 
Sex*Malta 
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Sex*Netherland -1.06 
(1.07) 
-1.51 
(1.05) 
20.67 
(13397.66) 
.27 
(1.09) 
Sex*Poland 
 
  .37 
(.97) 
   -.63 
(.98) 
   -.19 
(1.08) 
   1.76 
(1.23) 
 
Sex*Portugal   -3.45* 
(1.58) 
   .87 
(1.33) 
   20.85 
(15191.51) 
   .43 
(1.36) 
 
Sex*Slovakia   -22.33 
(23205.42) 
   20.42 
(23205.42) 
   19.87 
(23205.42) 
   20.47 
(23205.42) 
 
Sex*Slovenia   21.69 
(40192.97) 
   19.37 
(40192.97) 
   -22.24 
(40192.97) 
   19.84 
(40192.97) 
 
Sex*Spain   -.54 
(.84) 
   -.10 
(.85) 
   .18 
(.85) 
   .37 
(.82) 
 
Sex*Sweden   1.11 
(.102) 
   -19.35 
(11147.52) 
   -.30 
(1.21) 
   .69 
(1.14) 
 
Interaction 
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    -1.50 
(.80) 
   .08 
(.79) 
   1.22 
(.94) 
   .03 
(.91) 
Sex*Socialists    -.84 
(.54) 
   .97 
(.53) 
   .41 
(.56) 
   -.43 
(.63) 
Sex*Liberals    -.97 
(.76) 
   -.63 
(.74) 
   .54 
(.78) 
   -.53 
(.82) 
Sex*Conservatives    -.23 
(.53) 
   .61 
(.53) 
   .22 
(.55) 
   -.50 
(.63) 
Constant -.15 
(.14) 
-12 
(.37) 
-.10 
(.44) 
-.56 
(.36) 
-.95 
(.15) 
-.94** 
(.35) 
-1.16* 
(.51) 
-.43 
(.36) 
-1.35*** 
(.17) 
-1.52*** 
(.37) 
-1.45** 
(.56) 
-.98* 
(.39) 
-1.26*** 
(.16) 
-1.25** 
(.37) 
-.69 
(.46) 
-1.72*** 
(.49) 
Observations 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 
-2LL 831.00 807.33 773.51 823.86 906.80 881.68 853.02 897.96 922.18 902.84 863.10 918.94 870.07 851.70 835.42 868.16 
Nagelkerke R
2 
.11 .15 .21 .12 .00 .05 .10 .02 .02 .05 .12 .03 .00 .04 .07 .01 
Percentage Classified 73.8% 75.8% 77.0% 74.8% 72.7% 72.7% 72.9% 72.7% 70.9% 71.2% 71.7% 70.9% 74.9% 75.2% 75.3% 74.9% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party 
group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient reported for Sex*Malta since no women MEPs in the 5
th
 EP were from Malta. 
Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.  
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Table 11: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 6
th
 EP (2004-2009) 
 Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -.98*** 
(.17) 
-.96*** 
(.18) 
-.78 
(.56) 
-.74 
(.44) 
-.19 
(.19) 
-.24 
(.20) 
.48 
(.70) 
-.31 
(.46) 
.63** 
(-1.20) 
-.60** 
(.19) 
.73 
(.63) 
.75 
(.46) 
.16 
(.18) 
.21 
(.19) 
.49 
(.63) 
.71 
(.54) 
Nationality                 
Austria  -.56 
(.64) 
-.60 
(.96) 
  .58 
(.58) 
1.39 
(.99) 
  .10 
(.57) 
1.03 
(.95) 
  -.27 
(.63) 
-19.88 
(15191.51) 
 
Belgium  .18 
(.52) 
1.23 
(.96) 
  -.65 
(.68) 
-19.53 
(15191.51) 
  .09 
(.51) 
.41 
(1.01) 
  -.39 
(.47) 
-19.88 
(15191.52) 
 
Cyprus  .37 
(.92) 
.41 
(.92) 
  -.18 
(1.14) 
-.41 
(1.14) 
  .67 
(.86) 
.59 
(.86) 
  -20.27 
(16391.63) 
-20.37 
(16408.71) 
 
Czech Republic  .14 
(.52) 
.72 
(1.02) 
  -.25 
(.63) 
.29 
(1.28) 
  -.15 
(.53) 
-.06 
(1.25) 
  .09 
(.53) 
-.06 
(1.25) 
 
Denmark  .23 
(.63) 
-1.07 
(1.21) 
  -.50 
(.82) 
-19.53 
(17974.84) 
  .25 
(.62) 
.92 
(1.07) 
  .69 
(.60) 
1.73 
(1.07) 
 
Estonia  .13 
(.93) 
.32 
(1.49) 
  -.27 
(1.14) 
1.67 
(1.55) 
  .18 
(.91) 
-19.88 
(28420.72) 
  -.68 
(1.13) 
-19.88 
(28420.72) 
 
Finland  .53 
(.62) 
21.52 
(17974.84) 
  .39 
(.66) 
.29 
(1.28) 
  -.43 
(.70) 
-19.88 
(17974.84) 
  .37 
(.62) 
-.06 
(1.25) 
 
France  -.15 
(.37) 
-.06 
(.59) 
  -.22 
(.41) 
.58 
(.75) 
  -.07 
(.36) 
-.62 
(.78) 
  .25 
(.36) 
.81 
(.67) 
 
Germany  -.12 
(.35) 
-.11 
(.59) 
  -.19 
(.39) 
.17 
(.77) 
  -.01 
(.34) 
.01 
(.71) 
  .05 
(.34) 
.63 
(.67) 
 
Greece  -.37 
(.55) 
.61 
(.89) 
  .48 
(.54) 
.76 
(1.05) 
  .47 
(.49) 
1.03 
(.95) 
  -.36 
(.57) 
.41 
(1.01) 
 
Hungary  .05 
(.52) 
.32 
(.85) 
  .24 
(.55) 
2.18 
(.96) 
  -.05 
(.52) 
.22 
(.99) 
  .05 
(.52) 
-19.88 
(14210.36 
 
Ireland  .63 
(.63) 
.72 
(1.02) 
  .03 
(.72) 
.29 
(1.28) 
  .31 
(.63) 
.92 
(1.07) 
  -.70 
(.81) 
-19.88 
(17974.84) 
 
Italy  -.12 
(.37) 
-.37 
(.72) 
  .47 
(.38) 
.98 
(.83) 
  -.27 
(.36) 
-.55 
(.95) 
  -.09 
(.37) 
.92 
(.77) 
 
Latvia  .29 
(.77) 
-20.88 
(28420.72) 
  -.04 
(.86) 
1.67 
(1.55) 
  -.61 
(.85) 
1.32 
(1.52) 
  -.28 
(.85) 
-19.88 
(28420.72) 
 
Lithuania  -.90 
(.83) 
-.09 
(1.02) 
  .06 
(.73) 
.29 
(1.28) 
  .43 
(.64) 
-19.88 
(17974.84) 
  .14 
(.66) 
1.73 
(1.07) 
 
Luxembourg  -.06 
(.93) 
-.37 
(1.31) 
  -.37 
(1.13) 
.98 
(1.38) 
  -.73 
(.1.13) 
.63 
(1.35) 
  .99 
(.86) 
.63 
(1.35) 
 
Malta  -20.12 
(17974.63) 
-20.10 
(17974.84) 
  -19.76 
(17969.66) 
-20.01 
(17974.84) 
  -.74 
(1.15) 
-.80 
(1.15) 
  22.08 
(17974.72) 
22.03 
(17974.84) 
 
Netherland  .17 
(.49) 
-.02 
(.75) 
  -.49 
(.61) 
.58 
(.92) 
  .50 
(.47) 
.22 
(.87) 
  -.48 
(.56) 
.22 
(.87) 
 
Poland  -.30 
(.43) 
-.09 
(1.02) 
  -.19 
(.46) 
1.27 
(1.11) 
  .30 
(.38) 
-.06 
(1.25) 
  -.43 
(.43) 
-19.88 
(17974.85) 
 
Portugal  -.57 
(.58) 
-.37 
(.98) 
  .30 
(.56) 
.06 
(1.26) 
  .45 
(.49) 
.63 
(1.03) 
  -.66 
(.61) 
-.29 
(1.23) 
 
Slovakia  .16 
(.63) 
1.70 
(1.21) 
 
  -.52 
(.82) 
.29 
(1.28) 
  -.13 
(.65) 
-.06 
(1.25) 
  .05 
(.65) 
-19.88 
(17974.84) 
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Slovenia  -1.14 
(1.13) 
-.37 
(1.31) 
  1.00 
(.82) 
.98 
(1.38) 
  .01 
(.88) 
-19.88 
(23205.42) 
  .03 
(.88) 
.63 
(1.35) 
 
Spain  -.41 
(.42) 
-.13 
(.67) 
  .50 
(.42) 
.06 
(.89) 
  .25 
(.39) 
.87 
(.74) 
  .11 
(.40) 
.37 
(.77) 
 
Sweden  .47 
(.54) 
.14 
(.76) 
  -.43 
(.69) 
.69 
(.92) 
  -.75 
(.69) 
.34 
(.88) 
  .01 
(.59) 
-.98 
(1.19) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  .33 
(.42) 
 .85 
(.69) 
 -.34 
(.47) 
 -.67 
(.87) 
 -.26 
(.41) 
 .00 
(.78) 
 -.10 
(.45) 
 -.71 
(1.15) 
Socialists  .19 
(.27) 
 .33 
(.43) 
 -.29 
(.29) 
 -.28 
(.48) 
 -.25 
(.26) 
 -.20 
(.49) 
 .11 
(.27) 
 .67 
(.55) 
Liberals  -.06 
(.34) 
 -.32 
(.53) 
 -.15 
(.35) 
 -.20 
(.67) 
 -.38 
(.32) 
 -.04 
(.58) 
 .16 
(.33) 
 .99 
(.61) 
Conservatives  .21 
(.26) 
 .45 
(.44) 
 -.17 
(.27) 
 -.16 
(.49) 
 -.24 
(.24) 
 -.09 
(.50) 
 .13 
(.26) 
 .67 
(.56) 
Interaction 
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Austria   .19 
(1.27) 
   -1.17 
(1.24) 
   -1.43 
(1.20) 
   20.15 
(15191.51) 
 
Sex*Belgium   -1.68 
(1.19) 
   19.18 
(15191.51) 
   -.42 
(1.16) 
   19.84 
(15191.52) 
 
Sex*Cyprus 
 
                
Sex*Czech Republic   -.65 
(1.19) 
   -.77 
(1.46) 
   -.12 
(1.37) 
   .12 
(1.38) 
 
Sex*Denmark   1.94 
(1.42) 
   19.47 
(17974.84) 
   -1.02 
(1.31) 
   -1.59 
(1.32) 
 
Sex*Estonia   -.32 
(1.91) 
   -21.68 
(20096.49) 
   20.47 
(28420.72) 
   19.61 
(28420.72) 
 
Sex*Finland   -22.50 
(17974.84) 
   .22 
(1.50) 
   19.78 
(17974.84) 
   .67 
(1.45) 
 
Sex*France   -.09 
(.75) 
   -1.25 
(.92) 
   .81 
(.88) 
   -.88 
(.80) 
 
Sex*Germany   .09 
(.72) 
   -.46 
(.90) 
   -.02 
(.80) 
   -.84 
(.79) 
 
Sex*Greece   -1.52 
(1.21) 
   -.44 
(1.22) 
   -.80 
(1.10) 
   -1.12 
(1.23) 
 
Sex*Hungary   -.32 
(1.07) 
   -3.70 
(1.45) 
   -.42 
(1.16) 
   20.46 
(14210.36) 
 
Sex*Ireland   -.14 
(1.30) 
   -.19 
(1.55) 
   -.84 
(1.33) 
   19.61 
(17974.84) 
 
Sex*Italy   .33 
(.84) 
   -.68 
(.94) 
   .32 
(1.02) 
   -1.32 
(.88) 
 
Sex*Latvia   21.70 
(28420.72) 
   -2.27 
(1.91) 
   -2.53 
(1.89) 
   19.80 
(28420.72) 
 
Sex*Lithuania   -20.02 
(14210.36) 
   -.19 
(1.55) 
   20.98 
(17974.84) 
   -2.84 
(1.54) 
 
Sex*Luxembourg   .78 
(1.82) 
   -20.99 
(23205.42) 
   -21.24 
(23205.42) 
   .89 
(1.84) 
 
Sex*Malta 
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Sex*Netherland   .42 
(.98) 
   -2.02 
(1.42) 
   .50 
(1.05) 
   -1.26 
(1.19) 
 
Sex*Poland   -.31 
(1.13) 
   -1.71 
(1.22) 
   .45 
(1.31) 
   19.47 
(17974.85) 
 
Sex *Portugal   -.14 
(1.21) 
   .18 
(1.40) 
   -.26 
(1.17) 
   -.49 
(1.41) 
 
Sex*Slovakia   -2.69 
(1.64) 
   -1.17 
(1.69) 
   -.04 
(1.46) 
   20.49 
(17974.84) 
 
Sex*Slovenia   -19.73 
(20096.49) 
   .22 
(1.73) 
   20.47 
(23205.42) 
   -.90 
(1.80) 
 
Sex*Spain   -.34 
(.86) 
   .61 
(1.01) 
   -.93 
(.87) 
   -.32 
(.90) 
 
Sex*Sweden   .96 
(1.09) 
   -20.70 
(14210.36) 
   -20.96 
(14210.36) 
   1.81 
(1.41) 
 
Interaction  
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    -.74 
(.85) 
   .58 
(1.01) 
   -.29 
(.90) 
   .73 
(1.25) 
Sex*Socialists    -.40 
(.54) 
   .11 
(.58) 
   .01 
(.57) 
   -.57 
(.63) 
Sex*Liberals    .53 
(.66) 
   .09 
(.70) 
   -.48 
(.68) 
   -1.06 
(.72) 
Sex*Conservatives    -.43 
(.53) 
   .09 
(.57) 
   -.17 
(.56) 
   -.61 
(.63) 
Constant -.26 
(.14) 
-.31 
(.35) 
-.32 
(.46) 
-.51 
(.37) 
-1.15*** 
(.16) 
-.96* 
(.37) 
-1.67** 
(.63) 
-.94* 
(.39) 
-1.20*** 
(.16) 
-1.00** 
(.34) 
-1.32* 
(.56) 
-1.10** 
(.41) 
-1.10*** 
(.16) 
-1.20** 
(.36) 
-1.32* 
(.56) 
-1.69** 
(.49) 
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 
-2LL 840.83 824.72 796.87 835.55 759.24 740.38 711.09 758.17 899.57 885.40 858.80 897.01 847.44 817.78 778.00 841.95 
Nagelkerke R
2 
.06 .09 .14 .07 .00 .04 .10 .00 .02 .05 .10 .03 .00 .06 .13 .01 
Percentage Classified 71.0% 72.8% 73.0% 71.3% 78.2% 78.2% 78.5% 78.2% 67.7% 68.0% 68.1% 67.7% 72.8% 73.5% 73.9% 72.8% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party 
group are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient s reported for Sex*Cyprus and Sex*Malta since no women MEPs in the 6
th
 EP were 
from Cyprus or Malta. Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: Yordanova (2009). 
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Table 12: Logistic regression of EP committee assignment to an MEP in the 7
th
 EP (2009- ) 
 Social Welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex -.82*** 
(.17) 
-.81*** 
(.18) 
-.29 
(.54) 
-.88* 
(.37) 
-.11 
(.18) 
-.15 
(.19) 
-.07 
(.58) 
.04 
(.42) 
.51** 
(.17) 
.54** 
(.18) 
.93 
(.63) 
.48 
(.38) 
.27 
(.18) 
.27 
(.18) 
-.17 
(.58) 
.18 
(.40) 
Nationality                 
Austria  -.31 
(.60) 
-.13 
(.97) 
  -.58 
(.69) 
-.63 
(1.20) 
  .48 
(.56) 
1.50 
(.99) 
  .12 
(.60) 
-.63 
(1.20) 
 
Belgium  -.35 
(.56) 
.05 
(.85) 
  -.84 
(.68) 
-20.22 
(14210.36) 
  -.05 
(.55) 
.41 
(.99) 
  .51 
(.53) 
.47 
(.87) 
 
Bulgaria  -1.00 
(.70) 
-.13 
(.97) 
  .32 
(.58) 
.29 
(.99) 
  .29 
(.29) 
1.50 
(.99) 
  .33 
(.58) 
.29 
(.99) 
 
Cyprus  -.99 
(1.16) 
.56 
(1.48) 
  .15 
(.94) 
.98 
(1.49) 
  1.05 
(.89) 
-19.70 
(28420.72) 
  -20.22 
(16371.51) 
-20.22 
(28420.72) 
 
Czech Republic  .07 
(.54) 
.56 
(1.09) 
  -2.10 
(1.07) 
-20.22 
(20096.49) 
  -.15 
(.56) 
.41 
(1.28) 
  .66 
(.52) 
.98 
(1.11) 
 
Denmark  .46 
(.63) 
1.25 
(.97) 
  .15 
(.67) 
-.63 
(1.20) 
  -20.23 
(11089.30) 
-19.70 
(16408.71) 
  .62 
(.64) 
.29 
(.99) 
 
Estonia  -1.07 
(1.14) 
-.13 
(1.30) 
  -.64 
(1.14) 
-20.22 
(23205.42) 
  1.04 
(.87) 
2.20 
(1.34) 
  -.54 
(1.14) 
-20.22 
(23205.42) 
 
Finland  -.02 
(.65) 
.56 
(.83) 
  -1.52 
(1.08) 
-20.22 
(14210.36) 
  .96 
(.63) 
1.50 
(.90) 
  -.10 
(.72) 
-20.22 
(14210.36) 
 
France  -.09 
(.38) 
.25 
(.57) 
  -.61 
(.43) 
.15 
(.61) 
  .16 
(.39) 
.00 
(.71) 
  -.05 
(.41) 
-.74 
(.68) 
 
Germany  -.26 
(.37) 
.15 
(.56) 
  -.55 
(.41) 
-.24 
(.63) 
  .06 
(.37) 
.29 
(.68) 
  .12 
(.38) 
-.41 
(.64) 
 
Greece  -.54 
(.60) 
-.36 
(.95) 
  -.50 
(.64) 
-.81 
(1.18) 
  .90 
(.53) 
.59 
(1.00) 
  .54 
(.54) 
.69 
(.90) 
 
Hungary  -.62 
(.60) 
-.54 
(.93) 
  .53 
(.54) 
1.49 
(.87) 
  .34 
(.55) 
-.44 
(1.20) 
  .13 
(.57) 
-.12 
(.95) 
 
Ireland  .26 
(.67) 
1.95 
(1.20) 
  -20.26 
(11584.11) 
-20.22 
(17974.84) 
  .72 
(.66) 
.12 
(1.25) 
  -.59 
(.84) 
-20.22 
(17974.84) 
 
Italy  -.49 
(.40) 
.05 
(.68) 
  .08 
(.40) 
.19 
(.72) 
  .11 
(.38) 
-.44 
(.94) 
  -.10 
(.41) 
.19 
(.72) 
 
Latvia  -.60 
(.86) 
-.13 
(1.30) 
  -1.14 
(1.10) 
.29 
(1.13) 
  .77 
(.73) 
.81 
(1.34) 
  -.23 
(.86) 
-20.22 
(23205.42) 
 
Lithuania  -.40 
(.73) 
1.25 
(1.30) 
  -.07 
(.73) 
-20.22 
(23205.42) 
  .21 
(.68) 
-19.70 
(23205.42) 
  -.07 
(.73) 
.29 
(1.31) 
 
Luxembourg  .08 
(.93) 
21.76 
(40192.97) 
  -.57 
(1.14) 
-20.22 
(40192.97) 
  -.72 
(1.14) 
-19.70 
(40192.97) 
  .99 
(.87) 
22.18 
(40192.97) 
 
Malta  .14 
(.92) 
.15 
(.92) 
  -.51 
(1.15) 
-.56 
(1.14) 
  -.79 
(1.14) 
-1.03 
(1.13) 
  .26 
(.93) 
.46 
(.93) 
 
Netherland  .35 
(.49) 
.38 
(.75) 
  .14 
(.51) 
.80 
(.77) 
  -.04 
(.52) 
.00 
(.96) 
  -.36 
(.57) 
-.52 
(.92) 
 
Poland  -.56 
(.45) 
.74 
(.75) 
  -.23 
(.45) 
-.52 
(.92) 
  .69 
(.40) 
.00 
(.96) 
  -.14 
(.45) 
-.52 
(.92) 
 
Portugal  -.96 
(.64) 
-.13 
(.83) 
  -.60 
(.65) 
-20.22 
(13397.66) 
  .30 
(.55) 
.25 
(.97) 
  .26 
(.56) 
.76 
(.82) 
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Romania -.75 
(.52) 
-.13 
(.76) 
.32 
(.48) 
.29 
(.78) 
.45 
(.46) 
.81 
(.82) 
-.11 
(.51) 
-.12 
(.82) 
Slovakia  -1.20 
(.83) 
.15 
(1.01) 
  .21 
(.68) 
1.39 
(1.03) 
  .56 
(.64) 
.12 
(1.25) 
  -.16 
(.73) 
-20.22 
(17974.84) 
 
Slovenia  -.66 
(.89) 
-.54 
(1.24) 
  -.11 
(.88) 
-.12 
(1.25) 
  .60 
(.79) 
.41 
(1.28) 
  -.90 
(1.11) 
-.12 
(1.25) 
 
Spain  -.76 
(.45) 
-.66 
(.67) 
  .05 
(.44) 
-.86 
(.78) 
  .35 
(.41) 
1.32 
(.70) 
  .18 
(.43) 
.42 
(.65) 
 
Sweden  -.06 
(.55) 
-.69 
(.92) 
  -.76 
(.69) 
-.27 
(.93) 
  -.38 
(.63) 
.81 
(.90) 
  .45 
(.55) 
-.27 
(.93) 
 
EP party group                 
Radical left  -.17 
(.49) 
 -.12 
(.79) 
 .53 
(.50) 
 .21 
(.89) 
 -.28 
(.45) 
 -.98 
(1.12) 
 .23 
(.45) 
 .09 
(.89) 
Socialists  .26 
(.26) 
 -.19 
(.38) 
 -.05 
(.29) 
 .31 
(.44) 
 -.15 
(.25) 
 -.17 
(.42) 
 .08 
(.26) 
 -.02 
(.44) 
Liberals  .02 
(.32) 
 -.83 
(.50) 
 .06 
(.34) 
 .39 
(.52) 
 -.16 
(31) 
 .44 
(.48) 
 .16 
(.32) 
 -.39 
(.57) 
Conservatives  .22 
(.25) 
 .28 
(.36) 
 .02 
(.27) 
 -.09 
(.44) 
 -.32 
(.24) 
 -.37 
(.42) 
 .16 
(.25) 
 .21 
(.42) 
Interaction  
Sex*Nationality 
                
Sex*Austria   -.12 
(1.22) 
   .07 
(1.46) 
   -1.62 
(1.20) 
   1.09 
(1.38) 
 
Sex*Belgium   -.50 
(1.12) 
   19.97 
(14210.36) 
   -.75 
(1.19) 
   .09 
(1.09) 
 
Sex *Bulgaria   -1.42 
(1.46) 
   .07 
(1.21) 
   -2.03 
(1.23) 
   .17 
(1.21) 
 
Sex*Cyprus   -20.92 
(20096.49) 
   -1.03 
(1.91) 
   21.37 
(28420.72) 
   .17 
(34808.13) 
 
Sex*Czech Republic   -.67 
(1.25) 
   18.43 
(20096.49) 
   -.79 
(1.42) 
   -.28 
(1.25) 
 
Sex*Denmark   -1.32 
(1.32) 
   1.39 
(1.45) 
   -.93 
(22361.30) 
   .58 
(1.29) 
 
Sex*Estonia   -20.22 
(23205.42) 
   20.57 
(23205.42) 
   -2.32 
(1.84) 
   20.68 
(23205.42) 
 
Sex*Finland   -1.10 
(1.43) 
   19.88 
(14210.36) 
   -1.33 
(1.31) 
   21.78 
(14210.36) 
 
Sex*France   -.36 
(.74) 
   -1.94 
(1.00) 
   .12 
(.84) 
   1.20 
(.84) 
 
Sex*Germany   -.47 
(.71) 
   -.43 
(.79) 
   -.54 
(.80) 
   .89 
(.77) 
 
Sex*Greece   -.10 
(1.19) 
   .56 
(1.39) 
   .28 
(1.18) 
   -.13 
(1.11) 
 
Sex*Hungary   .18 
(1.18) 
   -1.65 
(1.14) 
   .86 
(1.36) 
   .46 
(1.17) 
 
Sex*Ireland   -2.89 
(1.65) 
   .07 
(23534.59) 
   .75 
(1.49) 
   20.46 
(17974.84) 
 
Sex*Italy   -.61 
(.82) 
   -.15 
(.85) 
   .43 
(1.02) 
   -.24 
(.85) 
 
Sex*Latvia   -.63 
(1.73) 
   -20.44 
(16408.71) 
   -.24 
(1.60) 
   20.68 
(23205.42) 
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Sex*Lithuania -2.48 
(1.71) 
20.57 
(23205.42) 
20.05 
(23205.42) 
-.39 
(1.58) 
Sex*Luxembourg   -22.30 
(40192.97) 
   19.88 
(40192.97) 
   18.89 
(40192.97) 
   -21.44 
(40192.97) 
 
Sex*Malta 
 
                
Sex*Netherland   .06 
(.97) 
   -1.14 
(1.06) 
   -.12 
(1.14) 
   .29 
(1.17) 
 
Sex*Poland   -1.81 
(.94) 
   .37 
(1.04) 
   .63 
(1.05) 
   .61 
(1.04) 
 
Sex*Portugal   -1.50 
(1.37) 
   20.46 
(13397.66) 
   -.15 
(1.17) 
   -.81 
(1.11) 
 
Sex*Romania   -.81 
(1.03) 
   .07 
(.96) 
   -.72 
(.98) 
   .11 
(1.02) 
 
Sex*Slovakia   -20.51 
(14210.36) 
   -2.29 
(1.52) 
   .46 
(1.46) 
   20.86 
(17974.84) 
 
Sex*Slovenia   .29 
(1.72) 
   .07 
(1.73) 
   .17 
(1.65) 
   -19.93 
(20096.49) 
 
Sex*Spain   .24 
(.86) 
   1.40 
(.92) 
   -1.85 
(.86) 
   -.37 
(.84) 
 
Sex*Sweden   1.36 
(1.14) 
   -.98 
(1.44) 
   -2.54 
(1.41) 
   1.24 
(1.16) 
 
Interaction  
Sex*EP party group 
                
Sex*Radical left    -.22 
(.98) 
   -.04 
(1.03) 
   .95 
(1.21) 
   .22 
(1.01) 
Sex*Socialists    .44 
(.49) 
   -.56 
(.55) 
   .11 
(.50) 
   .18 
(.53) 
Sex*Liberals    1.37* 
(.63) 
   -.62 
(.67) 
   -.97 
(.61) 
   .76 
(.67) 
Sex*Conservatives    -.60 
(.47) 
   .22 
(.52) 
   .28 
(.48) 
   -.14 
(.49) 
Constant -.45*** 
(.13) 
-.27 
(.30) 
-.56 
(.44) 
-.39 
(.30) 
-1.18*** 
(.15) 
-.92** 
(.32) 
-.98* 
(.48) 
-1.31*** 
(.36) 
-1.09*** 
(.14) 
-1.15*** 
(.30) 
-1.50** 
(.55) 
-.96** 
(.33) 
-1.16*** 
(.15) 
-1.33*** 
(.32) 
-.98* 
(.48) 
-1.19** 
(.34) 
Observations 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 738 
-2LL 850.22 832.11 809.87 835.85 784.02 752.19 713.74 780.08 917.30 889.76 863.35 910.65 863.89 847.66 820.16 860.93 
Nagelkerke R
2 
.05 .08 .12 .07 .00 .07 .14 .01 .02 .07 .11 .03 .00 .04 .09 .01 
Percentage Classified 72.1% 72.5% 73.2% 72.1% 77.6% 77.6% 78.0% 77.6% 67.9% 68.6% 68.8% 67.9% 72.6% 72.4% 72.9% 72.6% 
Comment: *p<0.05, **p<0.001, ***p<0.001 Standard errors within parenthesis. The depended variables employed are membership in an EP committee in a named group. The United Kingdom and the Others EP party group 
are used as reference groups. Revisit the Methodology chapter (Chapter 4) for a thorough review of the variables. No b coefficient variable reported for Sex*Malta since no women MEPs in the
 
current 7
th
 EP is from Malta. 
Regression diagnostics show no problem with multicollinearity. Source: The official EP website.  
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Table 13: Predicted probabilities of EP committee assignments 
 Social welfare Basic functions Economic/Technic 
EP Woman (%) Man (%) Woman (%) Man (%) Woman (%) Man (%) 
1
st
 
(1974-1984) 
34.8 17.0   
  
2
nd
 
(1984-1989) 
58.5 19.4 18.3 35.4 20.7 34.1 
3
rd
 
(1989-1994) 
60.2 19.7 18.5 36.3   
4
th 
(1994-1999) 
40.9 20.2 23.9 37.5   
5
th
 
(1999-2004) 
46.3 18.4 20.6 32.4   
6
th
 
(2004-2009) 
43.6 22.6 23.2 36.2   
7
th 
 
(2009- ) 
38.0 21.9 25.1 36.0   
Comment: Only predicted probabilities for the significant b coefficients in Model 1 is reported. Source: The official EP website 
and Yordanova (2009). 
  
 69 
 
6 Conclusions 
Examining the EP committee compositions and assignments in all direct elected EPs, this 
study shows that: women are more commonly found in EP committees concerned with social 
welfare policies, but less commonly found in EP committees concerned with the basic 
functions of the EU policies, and economic and technic policies; and that sex has an impact on 
individual MEPs assignments to EP committees concerned with social welfare policies and 
the basic functions of the EU policies. 
However, to be able to fully conclude that sex has an impact on individual MEPs 
assignments, more data of MEPs´ profiles are needed for further examinations under which 
conditions the association holds. This implies a need for studies that explore the causal 
mechanisms behind assignments, e.g. how MEPs preference, interests and expertise affect EP 
committee assignments (see Yordanova 2009) as previously findings relying on qualitative 
interviews suggest that “… most members are able to self-select their committee positions and 
many do so primarily on the basis of their own policy preferences…” (Whitaker 2001:82) 
Hence, it is conceivable that women have greater preferences, interests and expertise in social 
welfare policies, than men and therefore to a great extent choose to join EP committees that 
are concerned with that type of policies. Conversely, this pattern of thoughts also implies that 
women have lower preferences, interests and expertise in the basic functions of the EU 
policies and therefore to a great extent choose not to join EP committees that are concerned 
with that type of policies. However, on the other hand, it is also possible that women and men 
are excluded from certain areas in politics (Wängnerud 1999:49). If this is the case, if 
exclusions exist, it can be interesting for further studies to problematize which impact this 
might have on the type of polices the EU adopts, and what this might mean on the hopes that 
the EP will solve the EU´s “democratic deficit” problem. Nevertheless, the findings of this 
study indicate that a division exists of how the power is distributed between women and men 
in the EP. Although, it is not possible, from this study, to draw any conclusions on what this 
division implicate. The finding of this study still goes in line with previous studies’ 
questioning of the effectiveness of EU´s actions for balanced representation of women and 
men in the political decision-making process.  
Further, this study´s finding also suggest that feminist theory of legislative organization 
can bring important insights into the study of women´s descriptive representation in the EP. 
Although the theory needs to be revised and further developed at the supranational level. Thus 
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the findings in this study show evidence in support for a gendered division between different 
policy areas in the EP. But the finding indicates that the two most gendered policy areas are 
social welfare and the basic functions of the EU, and not social welfare and economic and 
technic which the feminist theory suggests. Furthermore, the inductive finding in this study 
suggests that neither nationality nor EP party group has an effect on women´s committee 
assignments. Consequently, the factors explaining why social welfare and the basic functions 
of the EU are the most gendered and sex characterized policy areas in the EP needs to be 
found in other theories, than the feminist theory that has been presented in this thesis. One 
approach for further studies can be to examine the EP´s internal organization from an 
institutional perspective.  
Further studies can examine the effect of the development of the legislative powers of the 
EP on the composition and assignments of the EP committees. Whereas the legislative powers 
in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 EP were limited to serving as a consultative body, with the introduction of 
the co-decision procedure in the 3
rd
 EP (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) the EP was given equal 
authority with the Council of Ministers, and subsequently the EP has steadily increased its 
application to most policy areas (culminating in the Lisbon Treaty, 2009). In other words, 
further studies can examine if the effect of sex on committee assignments differ depending on 
how the legislative powers of the EP in different policy areas have developed. Additionally, 
the effect of the differences in the EP committees’ power on the composition and assignments 
of the EP committees can also be addressed by future studies. Hence, the EP committees´ 
powers differ depending how much they can in influence the EU budget and legislation, and 
further studies can examine if the effect of sex on committee assignments differ depending 
how power full the EP committees are.   
Lastly, women´s representation in the EP is an important research area, and it is essential 
that further studies increases the knowledge in order to better understand how the power 
between women and men is distribution within the EP, and why a division exists. 
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Appendix 1 
The expansion of the EP committee system 
Table 1 shows the expansion of the EP committees from the 1
st
 EP to the current 7
th
 EP, and the enlargement of the EU from 10 member states in the 1
st
 EP to 
27 member states in the current 7
th
 EP. 
Table 1: Committee expansion of the EP from 1979 to 2009 
1
st  
(1979-1984) 
2
nd 
(1984-1989) 
3
rd 
(1989-1994) 
4
th 
(1994-1999) 
5
th 
(1999-2004) 
6
th 
(2004-2009) 
7
th 
(2009- ) 
 
 Political Affairs 
 
 Political Affairs 
 
 Foreign Affairs 
 
 Foreign Affairs 
 
 Foreign Affairs 
 
 Foreign Affairs 
 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Agriculture, fisheries 
and food 
 Agriculture, fisheries 
and food 
 Agriculture, fisheries 
and food 
 Agriculture and rural 
development 
 Agriculture and rural 
development 
 Agriculture and rural 
development 
 Agriculture and rural 
development 
    Fisheries  Fisheries  Fisheries  Fisheries 
   Civil liberties and 
internal affairs 
 Civil liberties and 
internal affairs 
 Citizen´s freedoms and 
rights, justice and 
home affairs 
 Civil liberties, justice 
and home affairs 
 Civil liberties, justice 
and home affairs 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs  
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 Industry, external 
trade, research and 
energy 
 Industry, research and 
energy 
 Industry, research and 
energy 
 External economic 
relations 
 External economic 
relations 
 External economic 
relations 
 External economic 
relations 
  International trade  International trade 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Legal affairs and the 
internal market 
 Legal affairs  Legal affairs 
      Internal market and 
consumer protection 
 Internal market and 
consumer protection 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Social affairs, 
employment and the 
working environment 
 Social affairs, 
employment and the 
working environment 
 Employment and social 
affairs 
 Employment and social 
affairs 
 Employment and social 
affairs 
 Regional policy and 
regional planning 
 Regional policy and 
regional planning 
 Regional policy, 
regional planning and 
relations with regional 
and local authorities 
 Regional policy, 
regional planning and 
relations with regional 
and local authorities 
 
 Regional policy, 
transport and tourism 
 Regional development  Regional development 
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 Transport 
 
 Transport 
 
 Transport and tourism 
 
 Transport and tourism 
  
 Transport and tourism 
 
 Transport and tourism 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection  
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
policy 
 Environment, public 
health and food safety 
 Environment, public 
health and food safety 
 Youth, culture, 
education, information 
and sport 
 Youth, culture, 
education, information 
and sport 
 Culture, youth, 
education and the 
media 
 Culture, youth, 
education and the 
media 
 Culture, youth, 
education, the media 
and sport 
 Culture and education  Culture and education 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Development  Development 
 Budgets   Budgets  Budgets  Budgets  Budgets  Budgets  Budgets 
 Budgetary control  Budgetary control  Budgetary control  Budgetary control  Budgetary control  Budgetary control  Budgetary control 
 Verification of 
credentials 
      
 Rules of procedure 
and petitions 
 Rules of procedure, 
the verification of 
credentials and 
immunities 
 Rules of procedure, 
the verification of 
credentials and 
immunities 
 Rules of procedure, 
the verification of 
credentials and 
immunities 
 Constitutional affairs  Constitutional affairs  Constitutional affairs 
  Petitions  Petitions  Petitions  Petitions  Petitions  Petitions 
 Institutional affairs  Institutional affairs  Institutional affairs  Institutional affairs    
  Women´s rights  Women´s rights  Women´s rights  Women´s rights and 
equal opportunities 
 
 Women´s rights and 
equal opportunities 
 Women´s rights and 
gender equality 
Number of committees: ‘      
17 18 19 20 17 20 20 
Number of MEPs:       
434 518 518 626 788 732 754 
Total number 
of committee seats: 
      
523 599 651 768 876 861 848 
Average  
committee size: 
      
31 33 34 38 52 43 42 
Number of  
Member states: 
      
10 12 12 15 25 25 27 
Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009). 
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Appendix 2 
Classification of the EP committees 
Table 1 show in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions and 
Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 5
th
 EP been placed in.  
Table 1: Classification of the EP committees in the 5
th
 EP based on a continuum between 
reproduction  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Employment and 
social affairs 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
policy 
 Women´s rights and 
equal opportunities 
 Citizen´s freedoms 
and rights, justice 
and home affairs 
 Constitutional affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education, the media 
and sport 
 Legal affairs and the 
internal market 
 Petitions 
 
 Agriculture and rural 
development 
 Fisheries 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
transport and tourism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs 
 Industry, external 
trade, research and 
energy 
Source: The official EP website 
Table 2 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions 
and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 4
th
 EP been placed in. 
Table 2: Classification of the EP committees in the 4
th
 EP based on a continuum between 
reproduction  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Social affairs, 
employment and the 
working environment 
 Women´s rights 
 Civil liberties and 
internal affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education and the 
media 
 Institutional affairs  
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Petitions 
 Rules of procedure, 
the verification of 
credentials and 
immunities 
 
 Agriculture and rural 
development 
 Fisheries 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
regional planning and 
relations with 
regional and local 
authorities 
 Transport and 
tourism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
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Table 3 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions 
and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 3
rd
 EP been placed in.  
Table 3: Classification of the EP committees in the 3
rd
 EP based on a continuum between 
reproduction  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Social affairs, 
employment and the 
working environment 
 Women´s rights 
 Civil liberties and 
internal affairs 
 Culture, youth, 
education and the 
media 
 Institutional affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Petitions 
 Rules of procedure, 
the verification of 
credentials and 
immunities 
 
 Agriculture, fisheries 
and food 
 Foreign Affairs 
 Regional policy, 
regional planning and 
relations with 
regional and local 
authorities 
 Transport and 
tourism 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
Table 4 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions 
and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 2
nd
 EP been placed in.  
Table 4: Classification of the EP committees in the 2
nd
 EP based on a continuum between 
reproduction  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Women´s rights 
 Institutional affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Petitions 
 Rules of procedure, 
the verification of 
credentials and 
immunities 
 Youth, culture, 
education, 
information and sport 
 
 Agriculture, fisheries 
and food 
 Political Affairs 
 Regional policy and 
regional planning 
 Transport 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 External economic 
relations  
Source: The official EP website. 
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Table 5 shows in which of the four groups: Social welfare, Culture/Law, Basic functions 
and Economic/Technic, the different EP committees in the 1
st
 EP been placed in 
Table 5: Classification of the EP committees in the 1
st
 EP based on a continuum between 
reproduction  
Reproduction   Production 
    
Social welfare  
Committee: 
Culture/Law 
Committee: 
Basic functions 
Committee: 
Economic/Technic 
Committee: 
 Development and 
cooperation 
 Environment, public 
health and consumer 
protection 
 Social affairs and 
employment 
 Institutional affairs 
 Legal affairs and 
citizen´s rights 
 Rules of procedure 
and petitions 
 Verification of 
credentials 
 Youth, culture, 
education, 
information and sport 
 
 Agriculture, fisheries 
and food 
 Political Affairs 
 Regional policy and 
regional planning 
 Transport 
 Budgetary control 
 Budgets 
 Economic and 
monetary affairs and 
industrial policy 
 Energy, research and 
technology 
 External economic 
relations 
Source: The official EP website. 
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Appendix 3 
Classification of the EP party groups  
Table 1 show the classification of the EP party groups based on the classification scheme of Hix et al. (2009).  
Table 1: Classification of the EP party groups 
EP 1
st
 
(1979-1984) 
2
nd
 
(1984-1989) 
3
rd
 
(1989-1994) 
4
th
 
(1994-1999) 
5
th
 
(1999-2004) 
6
th
 
(2004-2009) 
7
th
 
(2009- ) 
EP Party Group        
Radical left 
 
 Communist and Allies 
Group  
 
 
 
 Communist and 
Allies Group 
 
 Left Unity 
 
 Confederal Group 
of the European 
United Left/Nordic 
Green Left 
 
 Confederal Group 
of the European 
United Left/Nordic 
Green Left 
 
 Confederal Group of 
the European 
United Left/Nordic 
Green Left 
 
 Confederal 
Group of the 
European 
United 
Left/Nordic 
Green Left 
Socialists  Socialist Group  Group of the Party 
of European 
Socialists 
 Group of the Party 
of European 
Socialists 
 Group of the Party 
of European 
Socialists 
 Group of the Party 
of European 
Socialists 
 Group of the Party 
of European 
Socialists 
 Group of the 
Party of 
European 
Socialists 
Liberals  Liberal and 
Democratic Group 
 Liberal and 
Democratic 
Reformist Group 
 Liberal and 
Democratic 
Reformist Group 
 Group of the 
European Liberal, 
Democrat and 
Reform Party 
 Group of the 
European Liberal, 
Democrat and 
Reform Party 
 Group of the 
Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for 
Europe 
 Group of the 
Alliance of 
Liberals and 
Democrats for 
Europe 
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Conservatives 
 
 Group of the 
European People's 
Party (Christian-
Democratic Group) 
 European Democratic 
Group 
 
 Group of the 
European People's 
Party (Christian-
Democratic Group) 
 European 
Democratic Group 
 
 Group of the 
European People's 
Party (Christian 
Democrats) and 
European 
Democrats 
 
 Group of the 
European People's 
Party (Christian 
Democrats) and 
European 
Democrats 
 
 Group of the 
European People's 
Party (Christian 
Democrats) and 
European 
Democrats 
 
 Group of the 
European People's 
Party (Christian 
Democrats) and 
European 
Democrats 
 
 Group of the 
European 
People's Party 
(Christian 
Democrats) and 
European 
Democrats 
Others 
 
 Group for the 
Technical 
Coordination and 
Defense of 
Independent Groups 
and Members 
 Group of European 
Progressive 
Democrats 
 Non-attached 
 
 
 Rainbow Group: 
Federation of the 
Green Alternative 
European Links, 
Agelev-Ecolo, the 
Danish People's 
Movement against 
Membership of the 
European 
Community and the 
European Free 
Alliance in the 
European 
Parliament 
 Group of the 
European 
Democratic 
Alliance,  
 Group of the 
European Right 
 Non-attached 
 
 The Green Group 
in the European 
Parliament 
 Rainbow Group: 
Federation of the 
Green Alternative 
European Links, 
Agelev-Ecolo, the 
Danish People's 
Movement against 
Membership of the 
European 
Community and the 
European Free 
Alliance in the 
European 
Parliament Group 
of the European 
Democratic 
Alliance 
 Group of the 
European Right  
 Non-attached 
 
 The Green Group 
in the European 
Parliament 
 Group of the 
European Radical 
Alliance 
 Group Union for 
Europe  
 Group of 
Independents for a 
Europe of Nations  
 Non-attached 
 
 Group of the 
Greens/European 
Free Alliance 
 Union for Europe of 
the Nations Group 
 Group for a Europe 
of Democracies 
and Diversities 
 Non-attached 
 
 Group of the 
Greens/European 
Free Alliance  
 Union for Europe of 
the Nations Group  
 Independence/Dem
ocracy Group 
 Non-attached 
 
 Group of the 
Greens/Europe
an Free 
Alliance  
 European 
Conservatives 
and Reformists 
Group 
 Europe of 
Freedom and 
Democracy 
Group  
 Non-attached 
Comment: The classification scheme of Hix et al. (2009) has been used to classify the EP Party groups. Source: The official EP website
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Appendix 4 
Codebook of the datasets  
VARIABLES CODING 
Dependent variables:  
Membership in an EP committee in the Social welfare group 
Membership in an EP committee in the Culture/Law group 
Membership in an EP committee in the Basic functions group 
Membership in an EP committee in the Economic/Technic group 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
 
Independent variable: 
Sex 
 
1 = man, 0 = woman 
 
Control variable Nationality:  
Belgium 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Bulgaria 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Cyprus 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Czech Republic 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Denmark 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Estonia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Finland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
France 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Germany 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Greece 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Hungary 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Ireland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Italy 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Latvia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Lithuania 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Luxembourg 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Malta 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Netherland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Poland 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Portugal 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Romania 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Slovakia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Slovenia 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Spain 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Sweden 1 = yes, 0 = no 
The United Kingdom 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Control variable EP Party group:  
Radical left 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Socialists 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Liberals 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Conservatives 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Others 1 = yes, 0 = no 
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Appendix 5 
Control of the number of seats in the different groups 
Table 1 displays the difference between the observed and the expected number of seats 
occupied by women based on the average percentage of seats occupied by women in all the 
EP committees.  
Table 1: Difference between the observed and the expected number of EP committee seats per 
woman based on the average percentage of women in all the EP committees (rounded to whole 
numbers) 
 Social welfare Culture/Law Basic functions Economic/Technic 
EP Women MEPs Women MEPs Women MEPs Women MEPs 
1
st 
(1979-1984)
 
+11 -7 -5 -7 
2
nd 
(1984-1989) 
+42 0 -12 -10 
3
nd 
(1989-1994) 
+43 -7 -16 -7 
4
th 
(1994-1999) 
+31 +5 -19 -3 
5
th 
(1999-2004) 
+49 0 -21 -7 
6
th 
(2004-2009) 
+40 +5 -21 -6 
7
th 
(2009- ) 
+34 +6 -19 -10 
Source: The official EP website and Yordanova (2009). 
 
 
 
 
